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Taxes are major source of public funds to finance government expenditures. Tax
authorities impose different kind of taxes and employ many agents to collect taxes
effectively. Some dutiful taxpayers will undoubtedly pay their tax liabilities while
many others will not. The Internal Revenue Service in the United States reports
that the estimate of income tax liability not collected is about 17, which translates
into 345 billion for 2001. It is important to make a distinction between tax evasion
and tax avoidance. The distinguishing characteristic of evasion is illegality. Whether
the reason for not paying tax liability is avoidance or evasion, economic models of
taxation need to be changed in the light of these realities. In this study, I analyze
some of the economic problems of tax evasion/avoidance.
In the first chapter, I discuss the relationship between number of tax audits,
tax administration reform and tax compliance in Turkey. In recent years, many
developing countries have carried out reforms in their tax administration to increase
their efficiency in collecting taxes. In 2005, the tax authority in Turkey established
Tax Office Directorates (T.O.D.s) in 29 provinces for the purpose of controlling
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the underground economy, improving taxpayer assistance, and increasing auditing
efficiency. By using the panel data on province level tax returns, my analysis answers
two questions. First, I examine the effect of audits on reported income and reported
tax liability. By controlling for the detectibility of evasion and other socioeconomic
variables, I find that audits have the same effectiveness in increasing reported income
and reported tax liability. Second, I investigate the effect of establishing T.O.D.s in
29 provinces on compliance in those provinces. I find that T.O.D.s are effective at the
extensive margin rather than the intensive margin. Thus, establishing T.O.D.s had
no significant effect on the compliance level of existing taxpayers while it increased
the number of tax returns significantly.
In the second chapter, I analyze the excess burden on income tax when tax
avoidance matters. I present a simple static labor supply model with endogenous
asset choice. Then, I examine how tax avoidance through asset trading affects the
labor supply response and the excess burden of income tax. Furthermore, I discuss
the implications of the tax policy analysis and show that a failure to account for
avoidance responses may lead to errors when estimating how tax reform affects labor
supply, tax revenue, and the welfare cost of taxation. Because of tax avoidance
through tax arbitrage, the progressivity of a given tax system will be less than what
the formal tax system implies.
In the third chapter,we study the Marginal Cost of Funds in the existence of
tax evasion. We develop a general equilibrium model of tax evasion, including the
expected utility of taxpayers and three different revenue-raising government policies.
In this rich model environment, we analytically derive the marginal cost of funds
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(MCF) for the alternative policy instruments. We consider two main fiscal reforms:
the revision in the nonlinear tax scheme and the changes in enforcement mechanism
(the audit and penalty rates). First, we derive the MCF for the tax reform and find
its key determinants. The derived MCF is greater than the previous ones since it
includes a ”risk-bearing cost” as well as tax distortion. The reform in enforcement
mechanism generates MCFs in different forms. Two more MCFs with respect to
audit and penalty rates are presented. Finally, we compare these three different
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Chapter 1
Tax Arbitrage and Excess Burden of Income Tax
1.1 Introduction
How labor supply responds to taxation is one of the most intensively re-
searched issues in public finance literature. A large number of studies have explored
various dimensions of labor supply choice and how tax reform affects hours sup-
ply. Efficiency loss caused by the distortionary tax has also been the interest of
economists. In standard models the efficiency cost of taxation is entirely due to
the fact that, due of the change in relative prices, individuals are induced to se-
lect socially suboptimal consumption baskets – to substitute away from relatively
highly-taxed goods to relatively lightly-taxed goods, such as leisure. A standard ex-
ercise in optimal taxation theory is to describe the tax system that minimizes these
costs, or to describe the tradeoff between these costs and the distribution of welfare
in the society. However, as a response to taxation, individuals do not only change
their consumption baskets but also may change their asset portfolio. Most of the
labor supply and optimal taxation literature abstracts from issues of tax planning
and tax arbitrage.
Hausman (1981), MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990), and Blomquist (1996)
are among the prominent econometric analysis of labor supply which assume an in-
dividual’s asset income is exogenous and determined independently of the supply
1
of hours. The positive analysis of how tax changes affect labor supply implicitly
assumes that the effective marginal tax rate changes in tandem with the statutory
marginal tax rate. The normative analysis of income taxation following Mirrlees
(1971) rests on the assumption that the optimal income tax schedule is some non-
linear function applied to true labor income. However, when tax avoidance through
asset trading is an option, labor supply predictions and the efficiency cost of tax
will be different than what traditional analysis predict. Taxation will induce some
people to choose a sub-optimal asset portfolio. Therefore, it is necessary to take
individuals’ portfolio choices into account in order to correctly estimate the labor
supply response and the deadweight loss of an income tax.
My purpose in this paper is to explore the excess burden of income tax
and labor supply behavior when individuals engage in tax avoidance. I set up a
static labor supply model where individuals decide how much to work and how
much to avoid taxes. Then, I analyze how big the labor supply response and the
excess burden of income tax are in comparison to standard models. Tax avoidance
can broadly be defined as one’s efforts and activities to reduce one’s tax liability.
One example is to pay a tax professional to alert one to the tax deductibility of
activities already undertaken. Another example is to change the legal form of a given
behavior, such as reorganizing a business from a C corporation to an S corporation,
re-characterizing ordinary income as capital gain, or renaming a consumer loan as a
home equity loan. A third example is tax arbitrage, when economically equivalent,
but differentially-taxed, positions are held simultaneously long and short, thereby
producing tax savings. Finally, re-timing a transaction to alter the tax year it falls
2
under is another example of avoidance. In this study, I focus on tax arbitrage as
a method of reducing one’s tax liability. In their empirical study, Altshuler and
Gentry (1995) show the prevalence of tax arbitrage behavior in the U.S. economy.
They show that in the group of tax returns with only mortgage interest deductions,
20 percent of returns receive tax-exempt interest, 46 percent receive retirement
contributions, and 25 percent receive capital gains. They conclude that instead of
reducing the principal of their mortgages as a means of saving through house equity,
some taxpayers choose to buy tax-exempt bonds, contribute to retirement accounts,
or own other assets that generate capital gains.
There are various ways of introducing tax avoidance into the basic labor sup-
ply model. Recent interesting theoretical studies include Mayshar (1991), Feldstein
(1999) and Slemrod (1998). Feldstein considers the case when tax avoidance takes
the form of consumption of goods that are tax-favored either through deductions
or exclusions, and he adds these categories to a utility function that also includes
leisure and non-favored consumption. By using the TAXSIM model he estimates
deadweight loss of 10 times more than Harberger’s classic 1964 estimate. He claims
that the relatively low estimated elasticity of labor supply leads to this conclusion.
Mayshar and Slemrod stick to the basic, two-good labor supply model, but intro-
duce a general tax avoidance technology, which is intended to reflect a richer but
unspecified structural model. In Slemrod’s(1998) model, for example, individuals
can reduce their tax liabilities by involving tax avoidance activities at some cost.
He studies the comparative statistics and compares the labor supply elasticity in
standard models with that of avoidance models for some specified avoidance cost
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functions. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1999) analyzes tax evasion, tax avoidance and
tax administration issues in a very broad way. They do not provide a model for tax
avoidance; instead they discuss the related literature in detail. Desai and Dharma-
pala (2008) investigate whether the composition of outbound capital flows from the
U.S. reflects the desire to circumvent home and host country institutional and tax
regimes. Their results suggest that a 10% decrease in a foreign country’s corporate
tax rate increases US investors’ equity foreign portfolio investment holdings by ap-
proximately 10%. Therefore, they conclude that the distortion to portfolio choices
induced by worldwide corporate taxes should be taken into account in welfare anal-
ysis of corporate taxation in a global setting.
I contribute to the relevant literature by considering tax arbitrage as
a means to avoid tax and also by combining it with standard models. In other
words, this work differs from Feldstein (1999) and Slemrod (1998) in the way that
avoidance is incorporated into the model. I assume that individuals can reduce
their tax liabilities by engaging in asset trading (i.e buying and selling tax-favored
assets and normal assets). I believe that the portfolio approach has some appealing
properties. It allows for the fact that not all tax-payers engage in tax avoidance.
Because of constraints on short sales, avoidance will be concentrated among the
rich. Also, it takes into account that many avoidance operations involve both a
buyer and a seller. This demand and supply approach highlights the influence of
relative asset yields in shaping the budget constraints of avoiders. Finally, based on
partial equilibrium analysis, Feldstein (1995b) argues that tax avoidance increases
the excess burden from income taxation to a considerable extent. But as I discuss
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below, the portfolio approach implies that the efficiency implications depend on
general equilibrium considerations.
I show that failure to account for tax avoidance leads to biased predictions
about the labor supply response and excess burden of income tax. In my model,
through asset trading tax-payers can reduce their tax liabilities. This causes the
effect of a tax change on labor supply to be modest. I find that the substitution
effect will be smaller in my model because effective marginal tax change will be less
then the statutory tax change. Also, taxation leads to sub-optimal asset allocation
and this causes the excess burden of tax to be greater than what standard models
predict. When I allow asset returns to be endogenous and assume that supply of
the assets is fixed, the total excess burden in the economy will be the same with
standard models. However, when the supply of assets increases with its price, the
excess burden will be greater than what standard models estimate but smaller than
my estimate for the perfectly elastic asset supply case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a simple tax
avoidance model is presented with two riskless assets. In section 3, the return
on tax exempt asset is assumed to be uncertain. Section 4 presents some general
equilibrium aspects. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
1.2 A Simple Tax Arbitrage Model
Consider an individual with an hourly wage rate w, labor supply ` , and a
time endowment of H hours. The utility function is , U(c,H−`), quasi-concave, and
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twice continuously differentiable. The government imposes an income tax schedule
T (B) where B is the taxable income. The only thing that distinguishes my set-up
from the standard, static labor supply model is that agents can buy and sell assets
with different tax status. In other words, asset choice is endogenous in out model.
More specifically, I assume that an individual has some wealth W , which is to be
allocated between a tax-exempt (denoted X) and a fully taxable asset (denoted D).
So, W = X +D
I let r denote the interest rate on taxable claims, and d the interest rate
on tax-exempt claims. I first start my analysis by assuming that both assets are
risk-free. Later in section 2, I relax this assumption and impose uncertainty into
the model. I may think of the tax-exempt asset as representing tax shelters like
pensions savings, gold, land, etc., while the taxable asset represents ordinary bank
lending, positive or negative. I assume that r > d so that agents have a trade off
between buying a taxable asset with higher return and buying a tax-exempt asset
with low return. This will induce some individuals who face a high marginal tax rate
to trade assets and reduce their tax liability(Tax Avoidance). There is a constraint
on short sales of the tax-exempt asset, but people may go short in the taxable asset.
This assumption guarantees that agents cannot take advantage of arbitrage without
decreasing their tax liability. Selling tax-exempt asset and buying taxable asset will
not reduce the tax liability. If I let taxpayers buy negative amount of X and positive
amount of D, they will be increasing their consumption level without avoiding tax.
Furthermore, without any constraint on X, in equilibrium all individuals will trade
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assets until their taxable incomes are equal.1
The taxable income and budget constraint of individuals can be written as
follows;
B = r(W −X) + w`
c = dX + r(W −X) + w`− T (B)
So, the maximization problem becomes,
Max
X,`
U(c,H−`) s.t c = dX+r(W −X)+w`−T (B), X ≥ 0 (1.1)
In the standard labor supply model, the individual optimizes with respect
to (1.1) , while treating asset choice X as a constant. In my model the individual
optimizes with respect to both ` and X. First order conditions from (1.1) are:
Uc
UL
= w[1− T ′(w`+ r(W −X))] (1.2)
d− r[1− T ′(w`+ r(W −X))] ≤ 0 (1.3)
= 0 if X > 0
First, consider the case of an interior solution(i.e X > 0). For these indi-
viduals, denoted by superscript “A” for “avoider”, tax avoidance is driven to the
point where the after-tax marginal return on the taxable asset, equals to return on
tax exempt asset;
r[1− T ′(B)] = d (1.4)
1I do not impose a non-negativity constraint on taxable asset. In general, especially relatively
rich people can easily get bank loans. However, some individuals might be constrained with short
selling the taxable assets in reality. For a general discussion of how capital market imperfections
and government regulations affect the scope for tax arbitrage, see Stiglitz (1983).
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Since everyone faces the same asset yields r and d in a competitive capital
market, (1.4) implies that all individuals at an interior portfolio equilibrium will
have the same marginal tax rate. For avoiders, tax avoidance will thus transform
the nonlinear statutory tax schedule into an effective linear schedule with slope







Equation (1.5) implies that the effective tax wedge for avoiders is determined in
asset markets. The tax system affects work incentives only to the extent that the tax
function T (.) affects the relative return on taxable and tax-exempt assets. Assuming
that marginal tax rate is a monotone function of taxable income, all avoiders report
the same taxable income:
BA = T
′−1(1− d/r) (1.6)
Monotonicity of marginal tax function helps us to get taxable income in
closed form. However it is not a critical assumption for the results I get.2 When
two individuals face different marginal tax rates, they can make a profit from trading
assets. The one with the low income sells the tax-exempt asset and purchases the
taxable asset, while the one with the high income does the opposite. This process
continues until taxable incomes are equalized, and total tax payments minimized.
However, because of the constraint on short sales the process of tax arbitrage might
be cut short. People with relatively low taxable incomes, who face an incentive to go
2In the U.S. marginal tax function is not strictly increasing but rather it is piecewise linear. For
such a tax system, eq.(1.4) implies that all avoiders will be in the same tax bracket even though
they might have different taxable incomes. Thats why it will not effect our results.
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short in the tax-exempt asset, will find that the non-negativity constraint prevents
them from doing so. For this group of people all wealth will be invested in the
taxable asset, and their labor supply will be determined in exactly the same way
as is predicted by the standard labor supply model. Non-avoiders decide on work
hours while treating their asset portfolio as exogenous, and accounting for the fact
that they – unlike avoiders – face a tax system where the marginal tax rate is an
increasing function of their labor income.
In sum, for tax avoiders, I have the response functions as below;
`A = `A(w,W ) (1.7)
XA = XA(w,W )
To derive the labor supply function of non-avoiders, henceforth denoted by super-
script “NA”, I set X = 0 in (1.2).
`NA = `NA(w,W ) (1.8)
XNA = 0
For a given utility function and tax system, wage rate(w) and initial wealth(W )
determines whether individuals are avoiders or not. Using equation (1.3), define
φ(w,W ) such that:
φ(w,W ) = d− r[1− T ′(w`NA + rW )]
Everybody with φ(w,W ) > 0 avoids and behaves according to (1.7), while
everybody with φ(w,W ) < 0 does not avoid and behaves according to (1.8). It
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is easy to check φ(w,W ) is increasing in w and W for fixed value of `NA. So, all
else equal, higher income taxpayers are more likely to avoid tax. Also note that,
taxable income of tax avoiders is determined by the curvature of the tax function
and by the relative return on tax-exempt and taxable assets. Parameters from tax
avoiders’ utility functions play no role. This follows directly from equation (1.6).
As a corollary, one can show that the choice of actually becoming an avoider does
depend on the utility function. This follows from the derivation of φ(w,W
My main interest is the labor supply and excess burden implications of tax
arbitrage model compared to standard models. Since I start with relatively unre-
alistic model (no uncertainty in asset returns), for now, I give a brief overview of
labor supply and excess burden implications of my simple model. For any arbitrary
tax reform, the labor supply of a tax avoider is only affected by an income effect.
This result holds for any individual who is at an interior portfolio equilibrium both
before and after the tax reform. This conclusion follows directly from the first order
condition in equation (1.5). A tax reform generates a substitution effect only if it
affects the wedge imposed between the marginal rate of substitution on the LHS and
the marginal rate of transformation on the RHS. Because this wedge is determined
in asset markets, and equal to 1− d/r , a tax reform can have no direct impact on
the wedge.
It is straightforward to compute the welfare loss associated with tax system
T (.). In an equilibrium without taxation, what lump-sum deduction(EV ) would be
10
equivalent to the introduction of tax ?3 For endogenous asset choice model, define
V T (w,W ),as indirect utility obtained in taxation equilibrium and V NT (w,W ), as
indirect utility obtained in no-tax equilibrium. Then, EV of taxation is:
V NT (w,W ) = Max
`
U(c,H − `) s.t c = rW + w`− EV (1.9)
such that V NT (w,W ) = V T (w,W ).The budget constraint recognizes that
X = 0 for everybody in the absence of taxation. Since r > d, and there is no tax,
no one will invest in the low-yielding asset4.
Consider next, how the welfare cost is computed if endogeneity of asset choice
is not recognized. Suppose that there is a complete information about the utility
function, and that all variables including consumption, leisure, and asset holdings.
To estimate the welfare cost of taxation in the standard labor supply model (i.e
asset choice is exogenous), define V ′NT (w,W ), as indirect utility obtained in no-tax
equilibrium. Then, EV ′of taxation is:
V ′NT (w,W ) = Max
`
U(c,H − `) s.t c = dX̄ + r(W − X̄) + w`− EV ′
(1.10)
3To calculate the actual welfare loss we need to subtract tax revenue from equivalent variation.
However, ignoring tax revenue doesn’t effect my results.
4When tax rate is zero, there should not be any supply for the tax-exempt asset since there is
no demand. The analysis would be the same when tax rate is very small but not zero. My goal is
to show that when tax rates decrease, individuals will re-optimize their asset portfolio buy buying
more taxable asset. Missing this point will result in underestimating the excess burden of the tax.
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such that V ′NT (w,W ) = V T (w,W ). Where X̄ is the optimal tax exempt
asset holding in taxation equilibrium. Since the asset choice is treated as exogenous
in the optimization problem, the asset income that appear in the budget constraint,
(dX̄ + r(W − X̄)), is the one that is observed in the equilibrium with taxation. So,
comparing the two models in terms of efficiency cost of income tax (i.e. equivalent
variations), I can state that: Calculations of the welfare cost of income taxation that
treat asset choice as exogenous imply that the perceived welfare cost, EV ′, will be
less than the true welfare cost, EV , by an amount given by EV = EV ′ + (r− d)X̄
.5 I will use the same method of calculating the excess burden in the next section.
1.3 Uncertainty in Asset Returns
The model that I develop above yields some restrictive results with the
assumption of two riskless assets. One of the unrealistic results in Section 1 is
that all individuals who involve in tax arbitrage end up having the same effective
marginal tax rate and the same taxable income. In addition to this, any tax rate
change results in an income effect and no substitution effect. In this section I relax
the assumption that assets are riskless. Specifically, I assume that there are two
states of the world. At the end of the period, assets yield a ”high” return (denoted
by ”h”) in one state of the world and a ”low” return (denoted by ”l”) in the other.
The timing in economy is as follows: At the beginning of the period individuals
have perfect information regarding their wage rates, initial endowments, and tax
5The proof follows directly from equalizing the budget constraints in optimization problems 1.9
and 1.10. By definition, V ′NT (w,W ) should be equal to V NT (w,W ). If budget constraints in 1.9
and 1.10 are equalized indirect utilities in no tax equilibrium will be equal.
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rates. They decide how much asset to buy and how much labor to supply at the
beginning of the period. At the end of the period income from asset holdings are
realized. With the probability of p, the”high” state is realized. Assets returns in the
”high” state are dh for the tax exempt asset and rh for the taxable asset. With the
probability of (1 − p) the ”low” state is realized. Asset returns in the ”low” state
are dl for the tax exempt asset and rl for the taxable asset. With these assumptions
about asset returns, individuals will not buy assets for diversification purposes since
high state and low state are not asset specific.6 In the current setting, tax exempt
and taxable assets are no longer perfect substitutes.7 In other words, individuals
do not trade assets only by considering their relative return, they also take the risk
they bear into account while making their portfolio. I also assume that dh < rh and
dl < rl. That is, the return on taxable assets is greater in both states of the world.
Again, with this assumption agents have a trade off between buying a taxable asset
with a higher return and buying a tax-exempt asset with low return no matter which
state occurs.
Contingent taxable income(B) and consumption(c) of individuals can be
written as follows:
Bh = w`+ (W −X)rh Bl = w`+ (W −X)rl
6Making more general assumptions for the asset returns and allowing individuals to buy asset
for diversification purposes will not effect our main findings as long as the expected return on
taxable asset is greated than expected return on tax-exempt asset. My simplifying assumption
make the calculations easier. For more information about portfolio distortion of corporate tax with
more general assumption about diversification see Desai and Dharmapala (2008).
7In an exceptional case, where relative returns of taxable and tax-exempt assets in high and
low state are equal, two assets will still be perfect substitutes to each other.
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ch = dhX+(W−X)rh+w`−T (Bh) cl = dlX+(W−X)rl+w`−T (Bl)
Individuals maximize their expected utility.
Max
X,`
pU(ch, H − `) + (1− p)U(cl, H − `) s.t ch = dhX + (W −X)rh + w`− T (Bh)
(1.11)
cl = dlX + (W −X)rl + w`− T (Bl)
X ≥ 0
First order conditions(FOC.) for X and ` respectively are :
pUhc [d
h − rh(1− T ′(Bh))] + (1− p)U lc[dl − rl(1− T ′(Bl))] ≤ 0 (1.12)
= 0 if X > 0
p[wUhc (1− T ′(Bh))− UhL] + (1− p)[wU lc(1− T ′(Bl))− U lL] = 0 (1.13)
Uhc and U
l
c are first derivatives of the utility function with respect to c in
the ”high return” state and the ”low return” state respectively. Likewise, UhL and
U lL are first derivatives of utility function with respect to leisure(L) in the ”high
return” state and ”low return” state, respectively. From equation (1.12) I can get
the condition for becoming an avoider. I rewrite the first FOC. for X = 0.
pUhc d
h+(1−p)U lcdl < pUhc rh(1−T ′(w`+Wrh))+(1−p)U lcrl(1−T ′(w`+Wrl)) (1.14)
The left-hand side of equation (1.14) is the expected marginal utility from
buying one unit asset X, while the right-hand side is the expected marginal utility
from buying a taxable asset (D). If an individual spends all his initial wealth(W )
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on D and the expected marginal utility of D is still greater than that of X, then the
individual does not buy any X in equilibrium. In other words, he does not avoid
any tax through asset trading. When carefully examined, it can be seen that when
initial wealth(W ) increases, everything else being equal, equation (1.14) is less likely
to be satisfied.8 Hence, as people become richer they are more likely to be avoiders.
This result appears consistent with the old saying among tax professionals that “the
poor evade and the rich avoid,” meaning that the rich tend to reduce their taxes
through legal “avoidance” measures such as tax arbitrage, while those with lower
incomes attempt more outright evasion. Given parameter values p, rh, rl, dh, dl,
utility and tax functions define a function φ(w,W ) such that
φ(w,W ) = [pUhc d
h+(1−p)U lcdl]−[pUhc rh(1−T ′(w`+Wrh))+(1−p)U lcrl(1−T ′(w`+Wrl))]
(1.15)
Individuals with φ(w,W ) > 0 will become avoiders while individuals with
φ(w,W ) ≤ 0 will not avoid any tax. For avoiders equation (1.12) holds with equality.
That is, for taxpayers who buy a positive amount of X, in equilibrium expected
marginal utility from buying 1 unit of X and 1 unit of D are equal. With uncertainty
in asset returns, taxable income is now contingent upon different states of the world.
Furthermore, taxable income (Bl, Bh) depends on preferences as well as the tax
function and other parameters. One of the restrictive results in section1 is that every
8Uhc and U
l
c are common in both side of the equation (1.14). On the right hand side (1−T ′(.))
term is extra. As W increase, it is easy to check marginal tax, T ′(.), to increase and (1 − T ′(.))
term to decrease. Thus right hand side will increase more slowly or fall more rapidly compared to
left hand side of the equation.
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avoider has the same taxable income. Imposing uncertainty into the model leads to
a more generalized result. Depending on individuals’ preferences over risk, initial
endowment and wage rate, the taxable income of avoiders will be different. Without
uncertainty the two assets are perfect substitutes to each other, so individuals fully
take advantage of tax arbitrage opportunities. With uncertainty, tax-exempt and
taxable assets are no longer perfect substitutes.
Over the years, one of the main applications of labor supply analysis has
been predicting how tax reform affects hours of labor supply, tax revenue, and
excess burden. In the context of the major tax reforms that were implemented in
the past, a number of studies have assessed the direction and magnitude of these
effects.9 Consider a tax reform that increases the progressivity of the tax function
T (.). What are the implications for the labor supply of avoiders?
The labor supply response to a change in tax system will have different
implications with contingent asset returns. In section 1, I find that tax changes do
not effect marginal tax, and thus tax changes have only an income effect on labor
supply. In this section, I see in equation (1.12) that marginal tax, T ′(Bh,l), depends
on preferences and the tax function itself, T (.). So, when tax function changes,
the marginal tax that people face will change as well. Labor supply will not only
be affected by the income effect but also by the substitution effect. This is in
line with what standard labor supply models (with exogenous asset choice) suggest.
However, the magnitude of the labor supply response to tax change in my model will
9See for example, Ziliak and Kniesner(1999) and Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) for US tax
reform and Agell, Englund, and Sodersten (1998) for Swedish tax reform.
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be different than what standard models predict. To find the labor supply response
in both models, define mh = T ′(Bh) and ml = T ′(Bl) as current marginal tax rates
in both states. Likewise, define Zh = dhX + (W −X)rh and Z l = dlX + (W −X)rl
as non-labor income in both states. With non-labor income and current marginal
taxes I can write the labor supply function as L(w,W,mh,ml, Zh, Z l). Now, I totally
differentiate labor supply function, marginal tax, and non-labor income to get,





dmh = T ′′(Bh)[dwL+dLw−dXrh], dml = T ′′(Bl)[dwL+dLw−dXrl] (1.17)
dZh = dX(dh − rh), dZ l = dX(dl − rl) (1.18)
Assume that initial wealth and wage rate is fixed or it does not change with
tax. Then dw = dW = 0. In standard models asset choice is exogenous and does not
respond to tax changes. This means dX = 0. However, as a result of increased tax
progressivity, my model suggests that individuals will buy more X to avoid some of
the tax liability. With higher taxes, the marginal return on X will be greater and
thus individuals will demand more of it. Hence, the change in X will be positive,
dX > 0. So, the marginal tax rate change dmh,l will be smaller in my model. This is
easy to see from equation (1.17).10 Then I have dmh < dmhstd , dm
l < dmlstd. Here,
dmhstd and dm
l
std are marginal tax rate changes in standard models while dm
h, dml
are marginal tax rate changes in my model. Also, note that dZ l = dZh = 0 in
standard models since dX = 0, while dZ l, dZh < 0 in my models.(see eq. 1.18 and
10Our model allows individuals to be able to reduce the statutory marginal tax unlike standard
models. So it is intuitive to have a smaller effective marginal tax change in our model.
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note that rh > dh and rl > dl) Now let us compare the labor supply response in
both models. Let dLstd be the labor supply response in standard models and dL
be the labor supply response in my model. Then re-writing eq (1.16) for my model











Subtracting one from the other yields the following;
dLstd−dL = Lmh(mhstd−dmh) +Lml(mlstd−dml)−dX[LZh(dh− rh) +LZl(dl− rl)]
(1.21)
Suppose first, Lmh , Lml < 0. That means increasing the marginal tax will
lead to a decrease in labor supply for standard models, dLstd < 0 . In other words,
labor supply function is upward sloping. Also, note that LZl , LZh < 0 since I
assume that leisure is normal good. Then, the first two terms and the last term in
the right-hand side of eq.(1.21) will be negative. This implies dL > dLstd. In other
words, my model suggests that the labor supply response of a tax increase will be
less negative than standard models, or it may be positive or even zero. There are
two reasons for getting this result. One reason is that tax increase creates a smaller
substitution effect in my model. This is trivial since marginal tax rate change will be
smaller in my model as I showed above. Another reason for having a different labor
supply response is that non-labor income is effected by tax changes in my model.
When the tax rates increase, individuals will substitute away from taxable assets to
tax exempt assets. This will cause non-labor income to decrease as I showed above
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in eq.(1.18). So, there is a non-labor income effect which will cause labor supply to
increase. Therefore, an increase in the progressivity of the tax system may cause
labor supply response to be positive, negative or zero depending on the magnitude
of the different effects.
Now suppose, Lmh , Lml > 0. That means that increasing the marginal tax
will lead to an increase in labor supply for standard models, dLstd > 0. Eq. (1.20)
implies that the labor supply response in my model will be positive too, dL > 0.
The first two terms in the right-hand side of eq. (1.21) will now be positive and the
third term is negative. So, it is ambiguous whether dL or dLstd is bigger.
Much of the interest in the standard labor supply model rests on the view
that a correctly estimated (compensated) labor supply elasticity is a vital input
when calculating the welfare cost of taxation. However, as first argued by Feldstein
(1995b), when people optimize along several margins at the same time, the elasticity
of the labor supply becomes a potentially misleading indicator of the welfare cost of
taxation. In estimating excess burden of income tax with avoidance opportunities,
the partial equilibrium model I present in this section is a special case in Feldstein
(1995b). However, specifically modeling tax avoidance through tax arbitrage help
us understand a real life avoidance practice better. Moreover, when I allow asset
returns to be affected by tax policy in the next section, income tax may not have
extra burden with avoidance.
In section 1, I found that excess burden of taxation is greater in my tax
arbitrage model compared to standard models because asset choice behavior is also
distorted in my tax arbitrage model. With uncertainty in the asset returns, I have
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similar results. To find the excess burden of taxation for the tax arbitrage model
(where asset choice is endogenous), define V T (w,W ), as the indirect utility achieved
in taxation equilibrium. Let EV h and EV l denote the state dependent lump-sum
deductions from consumption in no-tax equilibrium.I find EV h and EV l from the




pU(ch, H − `) + (1− p)U(cl, H − `) s.t ch = rhW + w` − EV h (1.22)
cl = rlW + w`− EV l
such that V T (w,W ) = V NT (w,W ). Since the return of the taxable asset is greater
in both states, without taxation, individuals will not buy any tax exempt assets(X)
and will buy taxable asset(D) with all of their endowments. It would be more
practical to have a single measure of excess burden rather than having a state
dependent excess burden. That’s why I define EV as the certainty equivalent of
subtracting EV h in ”high” state and EV l in ”low” state from consumption. EV
is calculated by using the following equation;
pU(rhW + w`− EV h, H − `∗) + (1− p)U(rlW + w`− EV l , H − `∗) (1.23)
= pU(rhW + w`− EV,H − `∗) + (1− p)U(rlW + w`− EV ,H − `∗)
Where `∗ is the labor supply in equilibrium.
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Now, let us see what would be the excess burden for a standard model
(where asset choice is exogenous).I assume there is perfect information about the
asset choice in taxation equilibrium. Again, let EV ′h and EV ′l be the lump-sum
deduction from consumption in ”high” and ”low” states respectively. Following
maximization problem yields EV ′h and EV ′l for a standard labor supply model.
Let V ′NT (w,W ) be the indirect utility function obtained from,
Max
`
pU(ch, H − `) + (1− p)U(cl, H − `) s.t ch = dhX̄ + (W − X̄)rh + w`− EV ′h,
(1.24)
cl = dlX̄ + (W − X̄)rl + w`− EV ′l
such that V T (w,W ) = V ′NT (w,W ). This implies that the indirect utility
obtained in problems (1.22) and (1.24) must be the same. Note that X̄ shows the
amount of tax exempt asset held in taxation equilibrium. Individuals do not change
their asset portfolio in standard models when there is no tax because asset income
is assumed to be exogenous. Again, let EV ′ be the certainty equivalent of deducting
EV ′h in ”high” state and EV ′l in ”low” state from consumption. Similarly, I can
find EV ′ from the following equation.
pU(dhX̄ + (W − X̄)rh + w`− EV ′h, H − `′∗) + (1− p)U(dlX̄ + (W − X̄)rl + w`− EV ′l, H − `′∗)
(1.25)
= pU(dhX̄ + (W − X̄)rh + w`− EV ′, H − `′∗) + (1− p)U(dlX̄ + (W − X̄)rl + w`− EV ′, H − `′∗)
Where `′∗ is the labor supply in equilibrium for standard models.
Next, I find a relationship between state dependent deductions in two mod-
els. Carefully examining the maximization problems (1.22) and (1.24) , I can state
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that with the following characterization the two maximization problems become the
same and thus yield the same utility level.
EV h = EV ′h + (rh − dh)X̄, EV l = EV ′l + (rl − dl)X̄ and `∗ = `′∗
With these equations, the left-hand side of equations (1.23) and (1.25) are
equal. Hence, the right-hand side of these equations will be equal to each other as
well;
pU [rhW + w`∗ − EV,H − `∗] + (1− p)U [rlW + w`∗ − EV ,H − `∗] (1.26)
= pU [dhX̄ + (W − X̄)rh + w`′∗ − EV ′, H − `′∗] + (1− p)U [dlX̄ + (W − X̄)rl + w`′∗ − EV ′, H − `′∗]
my goal is to compare EV and EV ′. The second term of the utility function (leisure)
is equal in both sides since `∗ = `′∗. So, I concentrate on the first terms (consump-
tion). Since rh > dh and rl > dl, I have the following;
rhW + w`∗ > dhX̄ + (W − X̄)rh + w`′∗
rlW + w`∗ > dlX̄ + (W − X̄)rl + w`′∗
Now, (1.26) holds if and only if EV > EV ′. Thus, I show that excess burden
in my model is greater than that of standard models. The difference in excess
burdens in different models is caused by the asset portfolio being exogenous in
standard models. The extra burden in my model reflects the expected amount
of asset income that would have been gained had the individuals been allowed to
choose their asset portfolio in standard models with no tax. To the extent that
taxation leads to an equilibrium with an inefficient asset allocation, an analysis
that ignores this fact underestimates the welfare cost of taxation. This result is
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similar to Feldstein(1999) which finds the excess burden of taxation to be ten times
greater than ”Harberger Triangle” in the existence of avoidance. In his study, tax
avoidance is through changes in the form of compensation (e.g., employer paid health
insurance) and through changes in the patterns of consumption (e.g., owner occupied
housing).
1.4 General Equilibrium Considerations
In previous sections I assumed that both taxable and tax exempt assets
were in infinite supply. That is why the tax system changes did not affect the
asset returns. In an open economy, it might appear reasonable to assume that
asset yields are independent of domestic tax policy. But in an economy where the
supplies of taxable and tax-exempt assets are less than perfectly elastic, it seems
reasonable to proceed under the assumption that domestic tax policy affects the
relative asset yield. For simplicity, I do not consider the uncertainty in asset returns
here. I assume that there is no uncertainty in the asset returns as in section1.
It is straightforward to introduce endogenous asset yields in my model. A basic
observation is that although there are two assets in the model, there is only one
independent equilibrium condition. Thus, I can only solve for relative asset returns
.For now, assume that the tax-exempt asset(X) is in fixed supply, denoted by S̄
11(Later I relax this assumption). This would be the case if X is, for example, land.
Then, I integrate the asset demand function in (1.7) over all tax avoiders to obtain
11Since the total initial wealth in our model is fixed, assuming only tax exempt asset is fixed,
implicitly means assuming fixed supply for taxable asset.
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market demand for the tax-exempt asset, and I solve for the value of d/r that makes
demand equal to supply,
∫
φ(w,W )>0
XA(w,W, d/r)dF (w,W ) = S̄ (1.27)
where F (w,W ) is the joint cumulative distribution function of wages and initial
wealth. Using (1.27), I can examine how tax reform affects the relative asset yield.
With this information I can proceed to examine the implications for labor supply,
tax revenue, and the welfare cost of taxation.
First, I compare my finding here with what I find in section 1 because in
this section I assume asset returns are riskless just like in section 1. When the tax
system affects the relative asset yield, tax reform also creates substitution effects for
those who engage in tax avoidance. In the standard model the labor supply of high-
wage individuals tends to decrease because of a negative substitution effect. In my
model, with an endogenous asset yield the labor supply of tax avoiders is affected by
a negative substitution effect because increased statutory tax progressivity leads to
a decrease in d/r . When statutory tax progressivity increases, there is an increased
demand for the tax exempt asset. But as the tax exempt asset is in fixed supply, this
excess demand must be choked down by a relative return adjustment that makes
it less favorable to own the tax-exempt asset. In the process the effective marginal
tax rate that confronts tax avoiders will increase.
Another important deviation from my previous analysis concerns the
computation of the welfare cost of taxation. When the tax-exempt asset is in fixed
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supply, it is no longer the case that tax avoidance imposes an excess burden which
is additional to the standard labor supply distortion. Although people still engage
in asset trade to avoid taxation, no real resource costs are used up in the process.
At the individual level, some people will hold more of the asset, and some will hold
less, than they would have in the absence of taxation. These effects will, however,
average out in the aggregate.12
Clearly, the assumption that assets are in fixed supply is not a realistic one.
Let us assume that the supply of the tax-exempt asset is neither perfectly inelastic
nor perfectly elastic. Specifically, let us say the supply function of the tax-exempt




XA(w,W, d/r)dF (w,W ) = S(d/r) (1.28)
Now let us try to see the effect of increased tax progressivity on labor supply
and excess burden. First, there will be a substitution effect on labor supply. When
the progressivity of the tax system increases, the demand for the tax-exempt asset
will increase. In equilibrium, relative asset return, d/r, will decrease. Since supply is
not fixed, the overall number of tax-exempt assets traded will go up. Marginal taxes
for many individuals will go up but it will be less than the statutory progressivity.
12This result is in contrast with Feldstein(1999) which finds the excess burden of taxation to
be ten times greater than ”Harberger Triangle” in the existence of avoidance. The difference
is caused by general equilibrium model versus partial equilibrium model in Feldstein(1999). In
general equilibrium model relative price of leisure and deductables are dependent upon income tax.
25
Second, the welfare cost of taxation will be greater than that of standard labor
supply models. There will be more tax exempt assets held by individuals after the
increase in tax progressivity. There might be some individuals with relatively less
initial wealth who sell the tax exempt asset. But there will be more people who will
buy more tax-exempt assets after the increase in progressivity. Thus, tax arbitrage
will create an extra burden in the economy as a whole, but it will be less than the
perfectly elastic asset supply case.(i.e as in section1)
1.5 Conclusion
What keeps people working, given the very high marginal tax rates that
can be observed for some countries? The traditional answer has been that labor
supply is rather inelastic. my proposed answer is different. With the tax avoidance
technologies that became increasingly available in the last decades, those who care
about incentives need not pay those high tax rates.
This paper fills a gap in the public finance literature by exploring the labor
supply distortion and its magnitude when individuals avoid income tax. I formalize
the idea that high marginal tax rates could be circumvented by people with access to
modern financial markets, and I state some implications for the empirical analysis
of labor supply. I show that the standard approach of analyzing labor supply,
which treats asset choice as exogenous, may give a very biased impression of how
progressive income taxation affects hours supply, efficiency, income distribution and
tax revenue. The standard approach overestimates the negative-hours response of
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people with high wages (i.e avoiders) to an increase in tax progressivity. It also
overstates the extent of income redistribution that takes place and the revenue gains
for the government. By neglecting the role of portfolio adjustments, the standard
approach also underestimates (subject to the qualifications discussed in section 5)
the overall efficiency losses imposed by high marginal tax rates.
Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) find in their study of the U.S. Tax Reform Act
of 1986 that the most responsive decisions were financial and accounting activities.
They claim that these activities primarily serve the purpose of affecting reported
income, while activities like labor supply, savings, and investment seemed to respond
very little to tax reform. In their study of the Swedish tax reform of 1990-91, Agell,
Englund, and Södersten (1998) find that labor supply appeared unresponsive despite
marginal rate cuts between 24 and 27 percentage points for large groups of full-time
employees. The model I present in this paper helps us understand these empirical
findings better.
There might also be real resource costs associated with tax avoidance (e.g.
money and time spent for avoidance activities). Furthermore, avoidance responses
are not the only behavioral responses to increasing tax rates. Higher marginal taxes
may also induce tax-payers to evade some of their tax liability. These costs should
also be considered when correctly estimating the dead-weight loss of an income tax.
My paper does not take these costs into account. Nevertheless, from my work, one
can get an idea about the direction of the bias in traditional labor supply studies
which treats asset income exogenously.
I believe that the mechanisms analyzed in the present paper are quite rel-
27
evant in countries with high marginal tax rates, non-uniform capital taxation, and
developed financial markets. In countries with less developed financial markets,
lower marginal tax rates, and/or uniform capital taxation, there is less scope for
avoidance. Also, my model is a single-period one, and it does not account for
the fact that there is an intertemporal dimension to many tax arbitrage strategies
(e.g. the postponed taxation associated with pension plans). Developing models




The Marginal Cost of Public Funds in the Presence of
Tax Evasion
2.1 Introduction
To fund unexpected public expenses or new public projects, a government
usually imposes additional distortionary taxes such as labor or capital income taxes
even though the higher tax liabilities could stimulate taxpayers to cheat the gov-
ernment. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the United States reports that the
estimate of income tax liabilities not collected for 2001 is about 17%, which trans-
lates into $345 billion.1 For cases in most other countries, the estimates are even
higher. In 2003, the income tax evasion was around 25% in France and 30% in the
United Kingdom.2 Taxpayers can reduce the burden of complying with tax liability
by underreporting income, but they have the risk of being caught in evasion which
generates another welfare cost. Therefore, when a government levies distortionary
taxes for public funds, the tax evasion itself matters. Taxpayers may or may not
have excess burden through the behavior of tax evasion. However, the taxpayers
are assumed to pay their tax liabilities fully in most economic analyses for evalu-
ating public projects, even though the whole revenue from the tax liabilities is not
collected in practice.
1See Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury (2006).
2See [18] for more detailed discussion.
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For the purpose of evaluating the public expenditures, a related literature
employs a widely known concept of marginal cost of public funds (MCF), which
measures the direct tax burden plus the marginal welfare cost from raising additional
tax revenues.3 However, including the prominent works of Browning (1976, 1987),
almost all subsequent research does not reflect the aspects of tax evasion in MCF
calculation. Even though [34] analytically measures the MCF for nonlinear income
tax in a general equilibrium model, he does not incorporate the tax evasion as a
behavioral response to a tax change. As noted by [48], the existence of tax evasion
produces a risk-bearing cost in another form of excess burden. Nevertheless, he does
not measure the MCF in the presence of tax evasion.4
Our purpose in this paper is to measure MCFs for alternative revenue-raising
policies analytically when the tax evasion matters. In order to do so, we develop
an analytical general equilibrium model in which taxpayers have an expected utility
function, and a government imposes nonlinear income tax, audit, and fine rates, to
fund public goods and lump-sum transfers.5 Since distortionary taxes are the main
instruments for public funds, it is important to know welfare cost to the use of income
tax in the presence of tax evasion. Using a cost-benefit framework as presented in
[34], we derive a “modified” MCF for nonlinear income tax (MCFT) in the context
of tax evasion and then identify as the key determinants the expected return and
3See [12] and [34] for the definition of MCF. This concept originates in the argument of [36].
4Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996, 2002) mention possible ways to incorporate tax evasion into
the calculation of marginal efficiency cost of funds (MECF) very broadly but do not present any
analytical model, so they do not derive the MECF (or MCF) as a function of easily observable
exogenous parameters.
5We extend a standard partial equilibrium model of tax evasion such as is presented in [3].
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variance of $1 evaded, which consist of only audit and fine rates, implying the
“riskiness of tax evasion.”6 On the other hand, a government audits more taxpayers
or puts higher penalties on tax evaders to increase compliance and raise public
funds.7 Hence, we derive MCF for audit (MCFp) and MCF for fine (MCFθ) once
more to examine welfare cost of tax enforcement policies. The remainder of this
work provides numerical examples of MCFs for policy recommendation for the U.S.
economy.
The main contribution of this paper is to present exact MCFs that are ap-
plicable to practical use as analytic formulae. To measure MCFT analytically, we
endogenize the behavior of tax evasion in a model closer to the actual tax environ-
ment. This analysis is not limited to the labor-leisure choice problems as used in
Browning (1976, 1987), [21], [34], and [7] but take actual taxpayer behaviors into
account. Taxpayers mitigate the burden of tax compliance by evading tax while
they bear a risk cost of being caught. The model of this paper considers not only
tax distortion of labor supply but also risk-bearing cost of tax evasion, to derives
MCFT in a general version of those in a number of papers as listed above that do
ignore tax evasion. Thus, the MCFT becomes an exact measure for evaluating pub-
lic expenditures. In addition, resting on the rich model environment in this paper,
we obtain MCFp and MCFθ. The two analytic formulae together with MCFT al-
low ones to compare the alternative revenue-raising policies on efficiency grounds.
6The MCFT includes tax enforcement policies as newly important parameters that the previous
works with no tax evasion do not identify.
7[43] recognize that audit or penalty rates can be used to raise revenue when the tax evasion is
present in a model and state that it is optimal to equalize marginal costs of raising revenue for the
two alternatives at the margin.
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To our knowledge, this analysis is the first attempt on such a policy comparison.
Therefore, the set of MCFT, MCFp, and MCFθ provides a criterion for evaluating
alternative revenue-raising policies for a given level of public funds. Consequently,
this paper fills the gap between the literatures on MCF and on tax evasion.
It is shown analytically that MCFT is greater with tax evasion than with no
tax evasion. This is due to the riskiness of tax evasion that tax enforcement policies
(audit and fine rate) introduce. If the tax evasion exists, an increase in income
tax rate raises both tax distortion of labor supply and riskiness of tax evasion,
stimulating less labor supply but more tax evasion. When the tax evasion does
not matter, an increase in income tax rate raises only the tax distortion of labor
supply, however. The MCFT with no tax evasion is the same as in [34]. In this
sense, this paper extends Mayshar’s MCFT exactly to the tax evasion case. By
using the parameter values that [45] suggests for the U.S. economy and finding
proper values of audit and fine rates from the model, we show that the numerical
estimate of MCFT with tax evasion is 1.155 while the estimate without tax evasion
is 1.076.8 When elasticities of labor supply are positive and marginal resource cost
of enforcement is sufficiently low, MCFp and MCFθ are less than 1, whereas MCFT
is greater than 1. If net-wage-rate elasticity of labor supply is positive, an increase in
income tax rate worsens the preexisting distortions of labor supply and tax evasion.9
On the other hand, if audit- and fine-rate elasticities of labor supply are positive,
8The numerical calculation uses the audit rate of .38 and the fine rate of 2. Furthermore, it
assumes that the collected revenue is used only for a tax-neutral government project.
9The positive elasticity of labor supply with respect to net wage rate implies that the labor-
supply curve is upward sloping.
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an increase in audit or fine rate alleviates the preexisting distortions.10 Hence, tax
reform and enforcement reform could be complements rather than substitutes in
this case. However, the magnitude of MCFs varies according to elasticities of labor
supply and marginal resource cost of enforcement in general.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a general
equilibrium model of tax evasion that can be used to measure MCFs and find the
condition under which the tax evasion exists. Sections 3 introduces a marginal
revision in nonlinear income tax to derive MCFT. In section 4, we consider a
marginal change in audit and in fine to derive MCFp and MCFθ respectively. Using
benchmark parameters that represent the U.S. economy, section 5 calculates the
MCFs numerically, evaluates the alternative revenue-raising instruments, and gives
policy implications. We note limitations on this analysis and offer future research
in the concluding section.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Taxpayer
Consider an economy in which there is a unit measure of identical taxpay-
ers. Each individual taxpayer has a quasi-concave and twice differentiable utility
function U(C, V,G), where C is consumption of marketable goods, V is leisure, and
G represents a publicly provided nonmarketable good. The taxpayers have three
different kinds of income sources. They earn a wage at a rate w by supplying their
10Audit rate elasticity refers to the elasticity of labor supply with respect to audit rate whereas
fine rate elasticity refers to the elasticity of labor supply with respect to fine rate.
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labor L from one unit of time (1 = L + V ) and get an interest I by renting their
stock of capital K0 endowed. In addition to these incomes, each taxpayer receives an
amount of government transfer C0 in a lump sum fashion. However, the privately
earned labor incomes above are subject to a nonlinear tax schedule T ; thus, the
government revenue is R = T (wL, φT ), where φT is a vector of marginal tax rates m
and an average tax rate t that the taxpayers face.11 The taxpayers are prone to hide
some of their tax liability, however, since the tax-collection agency cannot observe
all the earned incomes in the economy and, thus, audits only a fraction of them. In
order to prevent the taxpayers from evading their labor tax, the government employs
an enforcement mechanism φE that is a pair of an auditing rate p on the population
and a fine rate θ = 1 + π on the amount evaded, where π > 0 is the penalty rate.
It is assumed that if it investigates a taxpayer’s declared income, a tax-collection
agency immediately discovers tax evasion. Each individual makes the decision of
labor supply at the beginning of the period and, in turn, reports some portion of
their labor income X to the tax-collection agency. These reports determine the
after-tax income ex-ante. At the end of the period, the taxpayer’s actual level of
consumption becomes clear according to one of two possible states. That is, he finds
his amount of consumption C1 = I +wL−T (X,φT ) +C0 when not caught evading
tax as state 1, whereas C2 = I +wL−T (X,φT )− θ [R− T (X,φT )] +C0 in the case
of being caught evading tax as state 2.12 Denoting the tax evaded R− T (X,φT ) as
11As in [45] and [34], we assume that the government puts a tax only on the labor incomes, and
therefore TI = 0. This assumption allows us to compare our result to those of Stuart and Mayshar.
But, it could be rather straightforward to extend to the case of nonlabor income taxation.
12This setup slightly differs from Allingham-Sandmo (A-S) model. Here, the penalty paid by
the taxpayer is a function of the tax evaded, whereas in the A-S model the penalty rate is on the
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E, the budget constraint at each of two states can be rewritten as{
C1 = I + wL−R+ E + C0 if the taxpayer is not caught evading,
C2 = I + wL−R− πE + C0 if the taxpayer is caught evading.
(2.1)
Furthermore, when the tax collection agency audits each taxpayer at a probability
of detection p, the taxpayer has an expected utility function:
Ū = Ū (C1, C2, V,G, p) = (1− p)U(C1, V,G) + pU(C2, V,G). (2.2)
2.2.2 Tax evasion and labor supply
This subsection looks into the taxpayer’s decisions on labor supply and tax
evasion and derives a condition under which the tax evasion exists. This condition
will have an important implication on the results in the next two sections. Regarding
a market wage rate w, a nonlabor income I, and the government fiscal program Ω as
exogenously given, the individual taxpayer chooses each of two possible consumption
levels (C1, C2), a level of leisure V , and an amount of tax evasion E to maximize
the expected utility in eq. (2.2) subject to two budget constraints in eq. (2.1).13
Therefore, the corresponding Lagrangian is
L = (1− p)U(C1, V,G) + pU(C2, V,G) (2.3)
+ λ1 [I + wL− T (wL, φT ) + E + C0 − C1] + λ2 [I + wL− T (wL, φT )− πE + C0 − C2] ,
income evaded or underreported income. See [47], [17], [43] for more detail.
13Before we move on to the maximization problem of the taxpayer, it is worth mentioning about
the timing in the economy. First, each of the individuals faces the policy parameters (p, t, θ). Then
the equilibrium labor supply, evasion and wage are determined simultaneously. Finally, government
transfers and consumption level are realized. Note that policy parameters (p, t, θ) do not come
from an optimization problem. In other words, government does not optimize with respect to
these policies. If the government maximized total utility with respect to these policy parameters,
marginal excess burden of these policies would have been the same at the optimum.
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where λ1 and λ2 are the weighted marginal utility of income according to each of
two states. Setting the partial derivatives of the above Lagrangian equal to zero
finds the first order conditions:
LC1 = 0 : (1− p)UC(C1, V,G) = λ1, (2.4)
LC2 = 0 : pUC(C2, V,G) = λ2, (2.5)
LE = 0 : λ1 − πλ2 = 0, (2.6)
LV = 0 : (1− p)UV (C1, V,G) + pUV (C2, V,G) = (λ1 + λ2) (1−m)w. (2.7)
Evaluating the partial derivative LE at E = 0 together with eqs. (2.1), (2.4),
and (2.5), and then setting it greater than zero gives the condition for tax evasion
to appear (E > 0)
µ ≡ 1− pθ > 0, (2.8)
where µ represents the expected payoff of one dollar evaded, (1− p) · 1 + p · (−π).
Note that the tax parameters φT in the nonlinear tax function do not affect whether
the taxpayers evade or not. The existence of tax evasion depends only on the en-
forcement mechanism φE . If the expected return µ is less than or equal to zero,
then the risk averse taxpayers must not evade any amount of their tax liability.14
Just in the case of earning positive expected returns to one dollar evaded, the tax-
payers evade a fraction of tax that depends on a degree of risk preference as well as
a level of payoff expected. That is, the positive expected payoff in eq. (2.8) could
14If µ = 1 − pθ ≤ 0, there exists a corner solution which implies no tax evasion, E = 0. Thus,
the condition in (2.8) guarantees an interior solution, E > 0.
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be interpreted as a gamble favorable to the taxpayers.15 This condition will play a
key role in the two next sections. Plugging eqs. (2.4) and (2.5) into eq. (2.6) and







(1− p)UV (C1, V,G) + pUV (C2, V,G)
(1− p)UC(C1, V,G) + pUC(C2, V,G)
= (1−m)w, (2.10)
respectively. Eq. (2.9) shows that the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumptions of state 1 (not caught) and state 2 (caught) should be equal to the ratio
of ex-ante income loss relative to gain for one dollar evaded. An increase in either
probability of detection, penalty rate or both decreases tax evasion as the marginal
utility of consumption in state 1 becomes relatively higher than in state 2. In eq.
(2.10), the mean marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is
equated with net wage rate. Hence, a higher marginal tax rate or a lower wage rate
acts as a disincentive to labor supply since the mean marginal utility of leisure gets
relatively lower than that of consumption.
2.2.3 Firm
By borrowing a fixed stock of capital and employing a level of labor from
the individuals, an aggregated firm produces market product Y = f (K0, L), where
the production technology f has positive and diminishing productivity. Given the
product price of one (normalized for simplicity), a wage rate, and a capital rental
rate, the firm maximizes its profit Π = f(K0, L) − I − wL, which gives the wage
15A gamble is said to be fair (unfavorable) if it has a zero (negative) expected return. See [2]
and [48] for more discussions
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rate and nonlabor income as follows:
w = fL(K0, L), (2.11)
I = Y − wL. (2.12)
Then the firm’s demand and the individuals’ supply for labor together with the fixed
level of capital determine an equilibrium wage rate and an equilibrium rental price
of capital in the competitive factor markets.
2.2.4 Government
Since the size of population is measured as one, the probability of detection
p implies the ratio of taxpayers caught evading tax relative to all the taxpayers.
Therefore, the government revenue is
R̄ = R̄(wL,E, φT , φE) = (1− p) (R− E) + p (R+ πE)− h (p, θ) (2.13)
= R− (1− pθ)E − h (p, θ) .
In eq. (2.13), both of labor income and tax evaded affect the revenue R̄. Note that
if all the individuals report their incomes truthfully and pay their tax liabilities, the
government collects the revenue equal to R − h (p, θ). To secure a particular level
of revenue, the government can employ the nonlinear income taxes (φT = (m, t))
or force the taxpayers to pay the taxes they owe (φE = (p, θ)). The resource cost
h (p, θ) is increasing in audit and fine rates, i.e. hp ≥ 0 and hθ ≥ 0. The government
needs some portion of the collected revenue to cover the cost of detecting tax evasion
and penalizing tax evaders for dishonesty. The rest is used to finance the supply
of a nonmarket good G = g(RG) and the transfer of market goods C0 = e(RC)
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in which the technology of government production g and the transfer efficiency e
satisfy g′ > 0 > g′′ and e′ > 0 > e′′, and two tax revenues RG and RC (in terms of
market goods) are spent for G and C0 respectively. Consequently, the government
budget constraint becomes RG + RC = R̄, and the set Ω = {G,C0, φT , φE} stands
for the government fiscal program.
2.3 Tax reform
In two consecutive sections, we consider a balanced-budget marginal revision
in the government fiscal program Ω, including either a nonlinear tax reform that
alters φT or an enforcement reform that alters φE and a corresponding reform in
spending that changes G and C0. Following the cost-benefit framework as in [34],
this section first investigates the effect of a marginal revision only in the nonlinear
tax schedule on the welfare of individuals. The tax reform and corresponding reform
in spending {G,C0, φT } ⊂ Ω are desirable if total change in the taxpayer’s expected
utility is positive or equal to zero:
dŪ = ŪC1dC1 + ŪC2dC2 + ŪV dV + ŪGdG ≥ 0. (2.14)
Even though Ū depends on p as shown in eq. (2.2), there is no variation in Ū with
respect to p since a government does not consider any marginal changes in enforce-
ment policies. Differentiate the taxpayers’ two state-dependent budget constraints
in eq. (2.1), the interest in eq. (2.12) and the government revenue function in eq.
(2.13) to get dC1 = dY − dR + dE + dC0, dC2 = dY − dR − πdE + dC0, and
dR̄ = dR − µdE. Furthermore, we have dV + dL = 0 from one unit of time and
dY = wdL by differentiating the production function and then using the wage rate
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in eq. (2.11). Combining these equations together with the first-order conditions in
eqs. (2.4) - (2.7) gives
[
ŪG/ (λ1 + λ2)
]
dG+ dC0 ≥ dR̄+ µdE −mwdL, (2.15)
where the right- and left-hand sides of which indicate the marginal cost of tax
reform and the marginal benefit of corresponding reform in spending in terms of
dollar value.16 Suppose that the government uses a share β of its marginal revenue
dR̄ to transfer the market goods and the remaining to supply the nonmarket good,
i.e. dRC = βdR̄ and dRG = (1 − β)dR̄. Dividing the left- and right-hand sides of
eq. (2.15) by dR̄ > 0, we define the marginal benefit and cost of funds as follows:
MBF ≡ (1−β)g′(RG)
[
ŪG/ (λ1 + λ2)
]
+βe′(RC) ≥ 1+(µdE −mwdL) /dR̄ ≡ MCFT.
(2.16)
The left- and right-hand sides of eq. (2.16) imply the welfare benefit and cost of the
marginal tax dollar to the individuals in this economy. Note that R = T (wL, φT ) =
twL. Differentiating eq. (2.13) yields the marginal government revenue:
dR̄ = (1− γ)twdL+ wLdt− µdE. (2.17)
In eq. (2.17), γ = (dw/dL) (L/w) = −LfLL/fL is the elasticity of wage rate with
respect to labor supply. Substituting eq. (2.17) into the marginal cost of funds in
16From eqs. (2.4), (2.5) and (2.7), dŪ = λ1dC1 + λ2dC2 + (λ1 + λ2) (1−m)wdV + ŪGdG.
Plug dC1 = dY − dR + dE + dC0 and dC2 = dY − dR − πdE + dC0 into this equation to get
dŪ = (λ1 + λ2) [dY − dR+ dC0 + (1−m)wdV ] + (λ1 − πλ2) dE + ŪGdG. Since dY = wdL,
dV = −dL, dR̄ = dR − µdE, and from eq. (2.6), λ1 − πλ2 = 0, we have that dŪ =
(λ1 + λ2)
[
dC0 − dR̄− µdE +mwdL
]
+ŪGdG. Finally, set dŪ ≥ 0, divide this inequality by λ1+λ2,
and rearrange it to arrive at eq. (2.15).
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eq. (2.16) leads to the following:
MCFT = 1 +
µdE −mwdL
(1− γ) twdL+ wLdt− µdE
. (2.18)
If the expected payoff of one dollar evaded becomes less than or equal to zero (µ ≤ 0),
each taxpayer does not evade any fraction of his tax on labor income (E = 0). Under
this case, the taxpayer changes only his labor supply in response to the marginal
revision in tax policy. Consequently, the marginal cost of funds in eq. (2.18) exactly
reduces to that of [34]. However, our analysis generalizes Mayshar’s formula. We
derive the marginal cost of funds, including even the circumstance where taxpayers
evade their tax liabilities (E > 0) when the expected payoff is greater than zero
(µ > 0). Hence, the taxpayer changes his tax evaded as well as labor supply when
a government revises a given tax rate.
We evaluate the changes in tax evasion and labor supply, i.e. dE and dL
in eq. (2.18), to derive MCFT in terms of exogenous parameters in this model.
The evaluation of dE needs log-linearization and Taylor expansion. Taking log and
























In the left-side of the above equation, the second and third terms vanish out since
UCV (C1,V,G)
UC(C1,V,G)
= UCV (C2,V,G)UC(C2,V,G) and
UCG(C1,V,G)
UC(C1,V,G)
= UCG(C2,V,G)UC(C2,V,G) . The equation then re-
duces to
r (C1) dC1 = r (C2) dC2, (2.19)
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where r (·) ≡ −UCC(·,V,G)UC(·,V,G) denotes the absolute risk aversion or curvature of util-
ity function.17 Two state-dependent marginal utility functions UC(C1, V,G) and
UC(C2, V,G) can be approximated by the first-order Taylor expansion as follows:
UC(C1, V,G) = UC(C2, V,G) + UCC(C2, V,G)(C1 − C2),
UC(C2, V,G) = UC(C1, V,G) + UCC(C1, V,G)(C2 − C1).
Dividing these two approximations by UC(C2, V,G) and UC(C1, V,G) respectively









where the tax evaded E is assumed to be positive.18 The absolute risk aversion
at each of C1 and C2 is determined only by the tax evaded E as a endogenous
variable and two enforcement policies p and θ = 1 + π as exogenous parameters.19
Substituting the two absolute risk aversions into eq. (2.19) and using again the fact






(dY − dR+ dC0) , (2.21)
where σ ≡ p(1 − p)θ2 represents the variance of one dollar evaded. On the right
of eq. (2.21), the positive coefficient in the first parentheses measures the extent to
17Take the partial derivatives of eq. (2.9) with respect to V and G, and again, divide each of









18Even if E = 0 and thus C1 = C2, the two state-dependent marginal utility functions
UC(C1, V,G) and UC(C2, V,G) are equal to the approximations respectively, and furthermore, eq.
(2.19) is satisfied.
19Using absolute risk aversion term itself will add two additional parameters to our calculation
and will make the numerical estimation harder.
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which the taxpayers change the tax evaded when their incomes change. Since the
mean and variance that the coefficient includes depend only on the audit rate p and
fine rate θ, the degree of tax evasion in this economy is affected by the current state
of tax enforcement. In addition, eq. (2.21) shows that the taxpayers reduce their
taxes evaded when their disposable incomes get higher. Thus, the taxpayer responds
to the fiscal reform in the opposite way; they evade more taxes if the government
collects a revenue dR, but they evade fewer taxes if it transfers the revenue dC0
back. Since dY = wdL, dR = (1 − γ)twdL + wLdt, and dC0 = βe′ (RC) dR, the
change in tax evaded in eq. (2.21) can be rewritten as
dE = −
[
(µ/σ) (1− (1− γ)t (1− βe′(RC)))









in terms of the change in labor supply and average tax rate. Since both coefficients
in the first and second square brackets are positive, the change in tax evaded is
negatively related to the change in labor supply but positively related to the change
in tax rate. If a government increases tax rates and this causes less labor supplies,
then the taxpayers could evade much more. We do not conclude at this point,
however, because it has not been figured out yet whether the higher tax rate has a
negative effect on labor supply.
The next step is to evaluate the change dL in labor supply. Before doing
so, we adopt the virtual income concept that [29] introduced first and [34] applied
later. The concept is used in order to make linear budget constraints from the views
of utility-optimizing individuals, even though the tax function is nonlinear.20 In the
20See [34] for more detail.
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context of tax evasion, the two state-dependent budget constraints in eq. (2.1) can
be reformulated as C1 = (1 −m)wL + E + Z for being caught in tax evasion and
C2 = (1−m)wL− πE + Z for not being caught by applying a virtual income Z in
the following form:
Z = Y − (1−m)wL−R+ C0. (2.23)
Eq. (2.23) contains non-labor income Y − wL, the lump-sum transfer C0, and the
term (m − t)wL generated by the nonlinear tax schedule. Since each taxpayer
regards Z as exogenously given, the first order conditions in eqs. (2.4) - (2.7)
and the two reformulated budget constraints give the function of labor supply as
L = L((1 − m)w, p, π,G, Z). Therefore, after differentiating this function with




d ((1−m)w) + LGdG+ LZdZ, (2.24)
where η is the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to the net wage
(1−m)w. As in [45] and [34], the publicly supplied nonmarket good G is assumed
to be tax-neutral at the margin, which implies that the marginal change dG does
not directly affect labor supply, LG ≡ 0, or the government tax revenue.21 Using
the expenditure function approach, Appendix A.1 shows that η− (1−m)wLZ = ηc
in which the superscript c indicates ‘compensated,’ while no superscript implies
‘uncompensated.’ Using this fact and the assumption that LG = 0, eq. (2.24) can
21This assumption is ensured when the private goods is weakly separable from the public
good G in the expected utility function Ū . For example, if the conventional utility function
U(C, V,G) is additive or multiplicative, then the expected utility function Ū (C1, C2, V,G, p) =
(1− p)U(C1, V,G) + pU(C2, V,G) can satisfy the property.
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be rewritten as follows:
(1−m)(1 + γη)dL = −ηLdm− (ηc − η)dZ/w. (2.25)
In addition, after differentiating eq. (2.23), the marginal change in virtual income
Z is given as the following:




dR− βe′ (RC)µdE (2.26)
=
[















Conducting the total differentiation until now leaves a system of three equations
(2.22), (2.25) and (2.26) with three unknowns dE, dL and dZ. Substituting eq.
(2.22) into eq. (2.26), and in turn, eq. (2.26) into eq. (2.25) implies the proportional
change L̃ in eq. (2.27), in which the tilde above a variable (or parameter) represents
a proportional change in the variable (or parameter).
Solving the three equations above simultaneously gives dL and dE in terms
of exogenous parameters. Finally, substituting eqs. (2.22) and (2.27) into eq. (2.18),
we derive the MCFT for the tax reform in eq. (2.28)
L̃ = −
[





(1−m)(1 + γηc) + (ηc − η)
[




















a+ bηcdm/dt+ (µ2/σ +m) ((ηc − η)− ηcdm/dt)
,
(2.28)
where a ≡ (1−m) (1 + γηc) and b ≡ m− (1− γ) t.
The MCFT is only measured in terms of exogenous parameters. As seen
in eq. (2.18), MCFT in eq. (2.28) also reduces to Mayshar’s for µ2/σ = 0 (i.e., no
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tax evasion). It is possible to show that the MCFT in eq. (2.28) is greater than
Mayshar’s (See the equation 17 in his paper) when dm/dt > 1.22 This is logical
because the existence of tax evasion makes the economic environment uncertain
and, in turn, causes an additional burden to the economy. Our MCFT includes
both the labor supply distortion of tax and the risk bearing cost of tax evasion. In
eq. (2.28), we see that MCFT has a direct cost of one dollar plus an additional term
representing the labor supply distortion and risk bearing cost together. [48] points
out that the total excess burden of risk and tax distortion can be treated separately
if utility function is separable in consumption and labor. We do not restrict the
utility function to a specific form in our model. Therefore, risk bearing cost and tax
distortion are interrelated in our model.
2.4 Enforcement reform
In the previous section, the government revises the nonlinear tax schedule
for extra revenue to finance its additional expenditure. Even though the tax scheme
is used as a common policy instrument, the government could employ the audit rate
or the fine rate instead. For example, the IRS increased the audit rate on individ-
uals with more than $100,000 of income by 40% in 2004.23 This kind of practice
often attracts a new analysis on measuring the costs of enforcement policies. In
addition, the analysis can allow one to compare the costs of enforcement and tax
22Note that dm/dt > 1 is a sufficient but not a necessary condition to show analytically that
our MCFT is greater than Mayshar’s. [45] assumes that ratio of marginal tax rate and average tax
rate is constant and greater than 1. In progressive tax system for a given income level average tax
rate is always lower than the marginal tax rate. However, whether dm is greater than dt or not
depends on how the tax system is changed.
23Give reference at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/19/business/19irs.html.
46
policies together. Hence, this section derives two different MCFs when a tax collec-
tion agency could use either the audit rate p or the fine rate θ in the enforcement
mechanism φE . Although the two MCFs are derived separately at the end, we first
consider the revision in both the audit and fine rate by some point in this section
and then assume only the change in each of the enforcement policies from that point
on. Following the same definitions and steps used in the section above, we continue
to exploit total differentiation in order to investigate the effects of tax enforcement
changes on individuals’ welfare. Now, the enforcement reform and corresponding
reform in spending {G,C0, φE} ⊂ Ω are desirable if total change in the taxpayer’s
expected utility is positive or equal to zero:
dŪ = ŪC1dC1 + ŪC2dC2 + ŪV dV + ŪGdG+ Ūpdp ≥ 0. (2.29)
Eq. (2.29) includes Ūpdp as one more term than eq. (2.14). In contrast to the tax
reform, the revision in audit rate could directly affect the taxpayer’s utility function
since the uncertainty of this economy has been generated by the government’s ran-
dom audits. Differentiate two state-dependent budget constraints of individuals in
eq. (2.1), the market interest in eq. (2.12) and the expected revenue of government
in eq. (2.13) to have dC1 = dY −dR+dE+dC0, dC2 = dY −dR−πdE−Edπ+dC0,
and dR̄ = dR − µdE + (θE − hp) dp + (pE − hθ) dθ. We know from the previous
section that dV = −dL and dY = wdL. Combining these indentities together with
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≥ dR̄+ µdE −mwdL+
(











Eq. (2.30) implies that the marginal cost of enforcement reform on the right should
be less than or equal to the marginal benefit of corresponding reform in spending
on the left. The term Ūp = −U (C1, V,G) + U (C2, V,G) can be approximated to
−UC (C2, V,G) (C1 − C2) by the first-order Taylor expansion. Using this approxi-
mation together with eqs. (2.1), (2.5) and (2.6) and dividing each side of eq. (2.30)
by dR̄ > 0, we define the marginal benefit and cost of funds as




≥ 1 + µdE −mwdL+ (hp − θE + E/p) dp+ (hθ − pE + E/θ) dθ
dR̄
≡ MCFE,
where the government is assumed again to spend the fraction β of its marginal
expected revenue on the transfer. Compared to eq. (2.16), the marginal cost of
funds is quite different, while the marginal benefit of funds is still same in eq.
(2.31). Since there is no change in tax rates, dR = (1−γ)twdL. Thus, the marginal
change in the government’s expected revenue in eq. (2.13) becomes
dR̄ = (1− γ)twdL− µdE + (θE − hp) dp+ (pE − hθ) dθ. (2.32)
24From eqs. (2.4), (2.5) and (2.7), dŪ = λ1dC1 + λ2dC2 + (λ1 + λ2) (1−m)wdV + ŪGdG +
Ūpdp. Substitute dC1 = dY − dR + dE + dC0 and dC2 = dY − dR − πdE − Edπ + dC0
into this equation to get dŪ = (λ1 + λ2) (dY − dR+ dC0 + (1−m)wdV ) + (λ1 − πλ2) dE −
λ2Edπ + ŪGdG + Ūpdp. Since dY = wdL, dV = −dL, dR̄ = dR − µdE + (θE − h′ (p)) dp +
(pE − i′ (θ)) dθ, dπ = dθ, and from eq. (2.6), λ1 − πλ2 = 0, we have that dŪ =
(λ1 + λ2)
[
dC0 − dR̄− µdE +mwdL+ (θE − h′ (p)) dp+ (pE − i′ (θ)) dθ
]
−λ2Edθ+ŪGdG+Ūpdp.
Finally, set dŪ ≥ 0, divide this inequality by λ1 + λ2, and rearrange it to arrive at eq. (2.30).
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After inserting eq. (2.32) into the right-hand side of eq. (2.31), the marginal cost
of funds associated with the change in probability of detection p and fine rate θ
becomes
MCFE = 1+
µdE −mwdL+ E (php/E − pθ + 1) p̃+ E (θhθ/E − pθ + 1) θ̃
(1− γ)twdL− µdE + E (pθ − php/E) p̃+ E (pθ − θhθ/E) θ̃
. (2.33)
Through the same steps used in Section 4, we will evaluate the changes dL
and dE in response to the reform. As the first step, the change in tax evasion dE
is derived in terms of the change in labor supply dL. After taking the log and






= UCG(C2,V,G)UC(C2,V,G) to arrive at











Plugging eq. (2.20) into eq. (2.19) with the fact that dC1 = dY − dR + dE + dC0

















In eq. (2.34), the second term in square brackets shows that the changes in p and
θ decrease the amount of tax evaded. This implies that both the audit and fine
rate determine the existence as well as the degree of tax evasion. The enforcement
policies directly affect the evasion, whereas the tax codes indirectly affect the evasion
through the income change as in eq. (2.21).
From this point, we consider only the change in each separate enforcement
policy. The government is assumed to revise either of two enforcement policies p
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and θ. Let us introduce a function that makes both of the analyses simple. For
k ∈ φE , the function ξk is defined by{
ξp = pθµ/σ if dp 6= 0 and dθ = 0,
ξθ = 0 if dθ = 0 and dθ 6= 0.
Then two separate analyses can be united because they have perfect symmetry
except for the term that ξk implies. The second term in square brackets in eq.
(2.34) points out the only difference between two separate reforms. A revision in
audit rate directly reformulates individuals’ preference orderings, since the audit
rate as a policy parameter generates the uncertainty in this economy. Therefore,
based on the fact that dY = wdL, dR = (1− γ)twdL, and dC0 = βe′ (RC) dR, the
change dE for each of the two reforms becomes
dE = −
[
(µ/σ) (1− (1− γ)t (1− βe′(RC)))




(1− ξk) /µ+ (µ/σ) (pθ − khk/E)βe′(RC)




Next, we evaluate the change in labor supply dL by replicating the steps
employed in the previous section. Totally differentiating the labor supply function




d ((1−m)w) + εkLk̃ + LGdG+ LZdZ, (2.36)
where εk is the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to the en-
forcement policy k ∈ φE . Again, using the assumption that G is tax-neutral at the
margin and totally differentiating the virtual income in eq. (2.23) respectively, the
total effects dL and dZ become the following:
(1−m) (1 + γη) dL = (1−m)Lεkk̃ − (ηc − η) dZ/w, (2.37)
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µdE − E (pθ − khk/E) k̃
)
.
Finally, as in the previous sections, three equations (2.35), (2.37) and (2.38)
yield the change in labor supply and the MCFE as
L̃ =
[
(1−m) εk − (ηc − η)ϕ
(





(1−m) (1 + γηc) + (ηc − η)
[


























(1−m) (µ2/σ + (1− γ) t) εk + ϕ (1 + ck) (a+ (ηc − η) b)
,
(2.40)
where ϕ ≡ E/wL = − (1−m) (εck − εk) / (ηc − η) for k ∈ φE and ck ≡ (1 +
µ2/σ) (pθ − khk/E)− ξk.
In a world with tax evasion and positive tax rates there are two different
sources of deadweight loss (or inefficiency). One is distorted labor supply because of
labor tax. The other is the risk cost of evading tax. If we assume that wage, audit
and fine elasticity of labor supply are greater than zero (η, εp, and εθ > 0), then the
following results hold. Increasing tax rates (tax reform) causes a decrease in labor
supply and an increase in tax evasion (dL < 0 and dE > 0) as can be seen in the
above equations. Hence, tax reform worsens preexisting tax distortions. MCFT has a
direct resource cost of one dollar as well as additional deadweight loss. Thus, MCFT
is greater than 1. However, enforcement reform (i.e., increasing audit or fine rate)
causes an increase in labor supply and a decrease in tax evasion (dL > 0 and dE < 0).
This means preexisting distortions caused by tax are lowered by enforcement reform.
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MCFE has a direct cost of one dollar, marginal resource cost of enforcement, and
negative deadweight loss. For this reason, when the enforcement reform is costless
or has a sufficient low cost, MCFE can be less than one. Enforcement could actually
be a very useful policy, if costs associated with increasing audit or fine rates are
low. Increasing enforcement will lower preexisting distortions and yield more extra
revenue. The government can then use the revenue to lower other distortionary
taxes. This argument is very similar to the double-dividend hypothesis of [11].25
The first dividend is decreased labor supply and tax evasion distortions while the
second dividend is obtained by using tax revenue to lower some distortionary taxes.
If extra revenue from either enforcement or tax reform is used in the same
way, and the enforcement has a low marginal resource cost, MCFT is greater than
one while MCFE is less than one. In this case, the enforcement reform is superior
to tax reform. In that sense, tax reform and enforcement reform are complements
rather than substitutes in terms of efficiency. In other words, a tax reform in-
creases the excess burden while an enforcement reform decreases excess burden in
the economy. Thus, a tax reform should be accompanied by an enforcement reform
to minimize the extra burden caused by tax reform. A very high marginal cost for
enforcement or negative enforcement elasticity of labor supply may indeed cause tax
and enforcement reform to be substitutes.
Government can increase enforcement in two ways. It can increase the audit
25Double-dividend is the notion that environmental taxes can both reduce pollution (the first
dividend) and reduce the overall economic costs associated with the tax system by using the revenue
generated to displace other more distortionary taxes that slow economic growth at the same time
(the second dividend).
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or fine rates. It is not easy to see which enforcement policy has a lower MCF from
the above equations. However, the terms cp, cθ, εp, and εθ play an important role
in determining the magnitude of MCFs. Therefore, by comparing these terms, we
can say which policy has lower MCF. We mentioned above that probability and
penalty elasticities of labor supply mainly determine the response of labor supply,
dL, and it is positive if εp and εθ > 0. The bigger the elasticity, the greater the
labor supply response. Therefore, a higher elasticity means a higher decrease in tax
distortion and a lower MCF. The marginal cost of increasing the audit and fine rates
is included in the terms cp and cθ. As marginal cost of enforcement (audit and fine)
increases, both MCFp and MCFθ increase. Everything the same, the enforcement
policy that has higher elasticity of labor supply and lower marginal cost will have a
smaller MCF. We can also say that the audit and fine rates are substitutes for each
other in terms of efficiency of policy. They both decrease preexisting labor supply
distortion (conditional on εp and εθ > 0) and yield extra government revenue.
2.5 Numerical analysis
In this section, we calculate MCFs for alternative policies numerically. To
estimate MCFT, we need values for 8 parameters: ηc, η, t, m, dm/dt, γ, β, p, θ.
In Table 2.1, [45] suggests the following benchmark parameters for U.S. economy:
η = 0, ηc = η − .2, γ = .28, m = .427, m/t = dm/dt = 1.564. In addition, we
assume for now that β = 0. To find values for audit rate p and fine rate θ, we first
solve the model for a specific utility function. Then, to find proper values for audit
and fine rates, we match the tax evasion ratio that our model estimates with the
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real world tax evasion ratio, 17%.26 We assume separable CRRA utility function







where V is leisure and we normalize time endowment to 1 so that V = (1−L). We
assume utility function parameters δ and ε are equal to 2. We solve our model with
specified utility function and given parameter values. Equilibrium values of labor
supply and tax evasion imply that when p = .38, θ = 2, the tax evasion ratio is
17%.27 To estimate MCFE, we need values for εp, εθ, hp, hθ, and E more. In other
words, we need labor supply elasticity with respect to audit and fine rate, marginal
resource cost of audit and fine rate, and the amount of evasion. We find E, εp and
εθ from the solution of our model with utility function above.28
In Table 2.2, we compare our MCFT estimates with those of [34] for different
government policy and individual parameter values. We analytically showed above
that our MCFT estimate is greater than Mayshar’s. The estimates in the first
column are based on our MCFT formula. The second column estimates are based
on Mayshar’s formula. In the first row of Table 2.2, we present MCFT estimation
for different values of β. When β = 0, no government revenue is transferred to
taxpayers, and when β = 1, all tax revenue is transferred to taxpayers. We see
26IRS estimate of tax evasion for 2001 is 17%. U.S department of Treasury, Internal Revenue
Service (2006)
27There many values for p and θ that gives 17% evasion rate. We fix penalty rate to 1 and get
p = .38. IRS penalty rate for tax evasion varies between 25% and 75% depending on the nature
of the tax underpayment, so fixing penalty rate to 1 makes sense.However, auditing rate in the US
is much lower than 38%. In the real world auditing rate is not exogenous to taxable income. Also
it is much harder for wage earners to evade compared to self employed. Since our model does not
consider this aspect of tax evasion, 38% auditing rate seems reasonable.
28Tax evasion is .04, labor supply is .56 and taxable income is .23 in equilibrium in our model.
Note that we normalize time endowment and wage to 1.
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Table 2.1: Benchmark parameters for the
U.S. economy
Stuart (1984) : η = 0
ηc = η − .2
γ = .28
m = .427
m/t = dm/dt = 1.564
Baseline : εp = εθ = 0
β = 0
hp = hθ = 0
Model : θ = 2
p = .38
E = .04
that our MCFT estimate is greater than Mayshar’s no matter how the extra tax
revenue is spent by the government. In the second row, we change the marginal tax
rate, while in the third and fourth row we change audit and fine rates respectively.
It is not surprising that a higher marginal income tax rate leads to higher MCFT
for both our estimate and Mayshar’s. However, only labor supply is distorted in
Mayshar’s case, while both labor supply and tax evasion are distorted in our case.
More enforcement (higher audit and fine rates) means less MCFT because more
enforcement causes less evasion in equilibrium. In the third row, for p = .45, our
MCFT estimate is very close to Mayshar’s since people have almost no incentive
to evade when p = .45 (expected return on evading, 1 − pθ, is still positive but
very close to 0). We change labor supply elasticity in the fifth row. As elasticity
increases, labor supply distortion of a tax increase becomes more severe, and this
leads to higher MCFT for both our and Mayshar’s model.
Table 2.3 compares the MCFs for three alternative revenue-raising policies
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Table 2.2: MCFT with tax evasion versus without tax evasion
MCFT
Tax evasion No tax evasion
Benchmark case 1.155 1.076
Government policies
1. Share of marginal revenue
β = .618 1.210 1.160
β = 1 1.244 1.211
2. Marginal tax rate
m = .350 1.131 1.055
m = .460 1.167 1.087
3. Audit rate
p = .2 1.870 1.076
p = .45 1.070 1.076
4. Fine rate
θ = 2.3 1.092 1.076
θ = 2.6 1.078 1.076
Taxpayer
5. Net-wage-rate elasticity
η = .318 1.641 1.447
η = .5 1.986 1.687
(tax, audit, and fine rates), depending on different government policy and taxpayer
parameters. In general, MCFT is greater than MCFp and MCFθ in Table 2.3.
Audit and fine rates (p, θ) determine the riskiness of tax evasion (µ2/σ). More
riskiness means that the risk cost of evading tax is greater. Hence, as seen in
the third and fourth rows, either an increase in p and θ increases MCFs, raising
the riskiness of tax evasion. A higher marginal resource cost of tax enforcement
(hp, hθ) means higher MCFp and MCFθ. In fifth row, when hp = hθ = 5, MCFp
and MCFθ are 1.754 and 1.423 respectively, while MCFT is 1.155. Therefore, if
increasing enforcement marginally is costly, then tax reform has a lower marginal
cost compared to enforcement reform. Elasticities of labor supply also play a key
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role in determining the magnitude of MCFs for different policies. In the 7th row,
when εp = εθ = −.5, MCFp and MCFθ are greater than MCFT. MCFp and MCFθ
are 1.397 and 1.189 respectively, while MCFT is 1.155. Elasticities have an opposite
effect on MCFT and MCFE. While higher wage elasticity (η) causes more labor
supply distortion in the tax reform case, higher enforcement elasticities (εp, εθ)
mean less tax distortion for labor supply in the enforcement reform case.
In Figure 2.1, we graph MCFs for different values of µ2/σ when β = 0
, hp = hθ = 0. In our formulation of MCFs above, the term µ2/σ represents the
riskiness of tax evasion. Note that µ is the expected return on evading one dollar and
σ is variance of return. As the audit rate or fine rate goes down, µ increases while σ
decreases, and thus, overall µ2/σ increases. In other words, when auditing becomes
less common or when fines on evasion are lower, expected return on tax evasion
will be greater, and taxpayers will evade more in equilibrium. Thus, the taxpayers’
response dE to a policy reform will be higher (since expected return is higher),
leading to more distortion. MCFT is greater than MCFE for all values of µ2/σ, since
the enforcement is assumed to be costless. Figure 2.2 shows how MCFE changes
as marginal resource cost of enforcement (hp, hθ) increases. When the enforcement
policy to deter evasion becomes more costly, MCFE increases tremendously. This is
trivial because our MCFE includes the resource cost of increasing tax enforcement
as well as labor supply distortion and risk-bearing cost. Thus, when policymakers
decide which policy to use to raise additional tax revenue, they need to analyze
carefully how much increasing tax enforcement costs. In Figure 2.3 , we see how
MCFs change with public spending policy. As β increases, all MCFs go up. When
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Figure 2.1: MCFs and riskiness of tax evasion


























β = 1, extra tax revenue is returned to individuals. This compensates the income
effect of the tax or enforcement reform. As a result, when β goes up, labor supply
distortion increases, causing MCFs to go up as well.
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Figure 2.2: MCFs and marginal resource cost of tax enforcement
























Figure 2.3: MCFs and public spending policy



























In a general equilibrium of tax evasion, we analytically derive three MCFs
for the nonlinear tax, audit, and fine rates. Ignoring the tax evasion behavior will
underestimate the MCFT. In a world with tax evasion, individuals could get more
welfare loss from both tax distortion and uncertainty introduced by tax evasion.
When calculating MCFT, taking the risk-bearing cost of evasion into account will
give more accurate estimates. Thus, governments should consider the risk-bearing
cost of tax evasion while deciding on publicly funded projects. [4] argues that tax
evasion can cause another type of burden because of inefficient allocation of resources
by taxpayers who try to evade. Even though the MCFT estimates in this paper are
always greater than in [34] and [45], they are highly dependent on values assigned
to audit and fine rate, however.
Governments can also use audit rate or fine rate in addition to tax rate as
a policy tool. Considering efficiency cost of each policy is important when a gov-
ernment decides how to collect additional tax revenue. Our calculations show that,
compared to a tax reform, an enforcement mechanism generates a lower MCF if the
marginal resource cost of enforcement is low. However, when audit and fine elas-
ticities of labor supply are negative and the marginal resource cost of using these
policies is high, then the tax reform might have a lower MCF than the enforcement
reform. In addition, it may not always be feasible to use enforcement policies in
practice. For example, higher income individuals or some firms may lobby to gov-
ernment not to increase audit rate or penalty rate on tax evasion. Thus, using audit
or fine rate might have some additional costs to a society in terms of effort and
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time spent in passing bills in congress. Our model does not cover this aspect of the
economy. The magnitudes of MCFs are mainly determined by elasticities of labor
supply and marginal costs of enforcement policies in our model. Our model suggests
that when enforcement is costless or has a low cost and labor supply elasticities are
positive, using enforcement as a policy tool is superior to a tax reform. Furthermore,
when a government increase a tax rate, increasing enforcement neutralizes the extra
distortion caused by the increased tax rate.
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Table 2.3: MCFs with tax evasion for alternative revenue-raising policies
MCFT MCFp MCFθ
Benchmark case 1.155 .657 .587
Government Policies
1. Share of marginal revenue
β = .618 1.210 .704 .633
β = 1 1.245 .733 .662
2. Marginal tax rate
m = .35 1.131 .657 .587
m = .46 1.167 .657 .587
m = .35 (β = 1) 1.183 .703 .633
m = .46 (β = 1) 1.276 .748 .676
3. Audit rate
p = .2 1.870 1.250 .961
p = .45 1.070 .555 .529
4. Fine rate
θ = 2.5 1.065 .521 .513
θ = 3 1.033 .453 .469
5. Marginal resource costs of audit and fine rate
hp = hθ = .5 1.155 .674 .624
hp = hθ = 2 1.155 .877 .767
hp = hθ = 5 1.155 1.754 1.423
Taxpayer
6. Net-wage-rate elasticity
η = .318 1.641 .657 .587
η = .5 1.986 .657 .587
η = .318 (β = 1) 1.725 .725 .654
η = .5 (β = 1) 2.060 .720 .650
7. Audit- and fine-rate elasticities
εp = εθ = −.5 1.155 1.397 1.189
εp = εθ = .5 1.155 .433 .366
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Chapter 3
Effect of Tax administration Reforms and Audits on
Tax Evasion in Turkey
3.1 Introduction
Effective collection of tax revenues is a prerequisite for a healthy econ-
omy. A nation’s plan for economic development will fail if the government lacks the
means to collect funds mandated by that plan. Low tax compliance is a matter of
serious concern in many developing countries, which limits the capacity of their gov-
ernment to raise revenues in order to finance government expenditures. Economic
theory suggests that tax compliance depends on the enforcement policies of the tax
authorities, income, tax rates, and individuals’ tastes and preferences. Governments
use various enforcement policies to increase taxpayer compliance. Tax audits are
one of the most common enforcement mechanisms used to increase compliance of
taxpayers. Reforming certain aspects of the tax administration represents an al-
ternative way to increase voluntary compliance. The critical question, therefore,
is to what extent would tax payers alter their compliance behavior in response to
different policy alternatives.
This paper studies the effects of tax audits and tax administration reform
on tax evasion. First, I study the effect of the audit coverage on tax evasion by
allowing the endogeneity of audits and controlling for detectibility and other so-
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ciodemographic variables. I use panel data from 2003 to 2007 from 81 provinces in
Turkey. The data includes reported income, reported tax lability, number of tax
returns, average level of income, number of audits, number of negotiations between
tax-payer and tax office and number of tax office workers, all at the province level, as
well as the sociodemographics of the province. Second, I focus on the reform in tax
administration that took place in Turkey in 2005. The reform encompassed institu-
tional improvements, automation, transparency, compliance, taxpayer services and
audits. Presidency of Tax Administration (P.T.A), which previously operated under
ministry of finance, gained partial autonomy under the reform. After the reform,
P.T.A had responsibility for the internal organization of tax operations, including
the size and geographical location of tax offices; and the discretion to formulate
and implement strategic and operational plans. Also, P.T.A were given the ability
to recruit and fire staff, in accordance with public sector policies and procedures;
the ability to establish and operate staff training/development programmes; and
the ability to negotiate staff remuneration in accordance with broader public sector-
wide policies. For the first time, functions such as taxpayer services, auditing, and
strategic planning were introduced and organized both at the headquarters and at
the local level. In 29 provinces, a special tax office called the Tax Office Directorate
(T.O.D.) was established in order to realize these reforms. Specifically, T.O.D.s
were established to increase the quality of taxpayer services, to conduct strategic
planning for audits and to find non-registered individuals and register them. I test
whether T.O.D.s met their goal. Specifically, I analyze the effect of the reform by
using the 29 provinces in which a T.O.D. is established as a treatment group and
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the other 51 provinces as the control group. In other words, I investigate whether
establishing special tax units to increase taxpayer services and audit quality has a
significant effect on compliance at the province level.
Several studies analyze the effect of tax audits on tax compliance empirically.
Many of these studies use Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP)
data from the U.S.A.1 The TCMP data consists of line-by-line information about
what the taxpayer reported, and what the examiner concluded was correct. Dubin
and Wilde (1988) analyzes the effect of federal income tax auditing on compliance
at the three-digit zip-code level. For low- and middle-income non-business returns,
Dubin and Wilde find significant deterrent effects of audits on compliance. Beron,
Tauchen, and Witte (1992) also studies the effect of audits and socioeconomic vari-
ables on compliance at three-digit zip-code level. They use tax return data and
audit data for 1969 to estimate the effect of audits on compliance. Their measure of
compliance is aggregate reported income and aggregate tax liability. Using a simul-
taneous equation model with equations for taxpayers’ reports and for probability of
audits, they find significant deterrent effect of audits for low-income returns with
standard deductions. However, their results are very sensitive to model specification.
Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian (2001) conducted a more recent study about tax
compliance and audit. They focused on the effects of increased audit probability on
tax compliance. In 1995, a group of 1724 randomly selected Minnesota taxpayers
were informed by letter that the returns they were about to file would be ‘closely
1Some of the prominent studies that use TCMP data are: Nagin (1989), Feinstein (1991), and
Clotfelter (1983)
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examined.’2 By using the tax returns of tax payers who received the letter and those
who did not, Slemrod et al. analyzes this controlled experiment which is designed to
learn about the impact of an increased probability of audit. They find that a height-
ened threat of being audited increases reported income and tax liability for low- and
middle-income taxpayers. Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996) study the in-
come tax non-compliance in Switzerland by using aggregated data from 25 cantons
for 3 different years. They find that the probability of detection and the penalty
tax rate seem not to exert a significant deterrent effect on income concealing. Also,
in their study the marginal tax rate has a positive, whereas low-income allowances
have a negative impact on noncompliance. Acconcia, D’Amato and Martina (2003)
analyzes theoretically the interactions between evasion, corruption and monitoring
as well as their adjustment to a change in the institutional setting. In their model
taxpayers can bribe the auditors while a monitoring agency monitors bribing with a
certain probability. They find that in equilibrium, the effects of a tougher deterrence
policy, reduces evasion, whereas its effect on corruption is ambiguous.
The trend in modern tax administration is a strong focus on taxpayers, spe-
cialization of personnel, independence from the ministry of finance and privatization
of activities which can be better performed by the private sector. Tanzi and Pelle-
chio (1995) points out the five basic elements of a tax administration reform; Firm
and continuous political commitment, a staff capable of concentrated work over a
long period, a well defined and appropriate strategy, personnel training and edu-
cation, and change in the motivation of taxpayers and tax administration. Andic
2‘Closely Examined’ is the exact phrase they used in the letter.
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(1994) claims that special taxpayer services that help, inform and educate individu-
als increase taxpayers’ trust in the tax system. He also claims that special taxpayer
services lead to reducing compliance costs and improving the level of tax compli-
ance. Despite the fact that many developing countries have had reforms in their tax
administrations in the past decades, empirical works on the relationship between
the design of tax enforcement agencies and tax compliance are limited due to data
availability. However, there are a few studies that analyze different aspects of tax
administration reforms in different countries. Das-Gupta, Ghosh and Mookherjee
(2004) examine the tax administration reform in staff assignment and compliance
in India. Using the data from 49 local tax units over two years from three major
cities in India, they find that significant compliance gains would accrue from ex-
panded staff employment and changes in assignments procedures for both staff and
taxpayers. Even though Das-Gupta et al. present a structural model that allows for
self-selection of taxpayers into different tax units, the size of the data is very small.
Kahn, Silva and Ziliak (2001) studies the effects of a performance-based wage system
for tax administration staff. They use panel data from the Brazillian tax collection
authority to examine the effects of a major incentive reform instituted in 1989 to
improve tax enforcement. They find that the growth in fines per inspection after
the reform is about 75% above what it would have been without reform. However,
their analysis is limited to the effect of the reform on fines collected. They do not
investigate the effect of the reform on taxpayer compliance.
This work contributes to existing empirical tax evasion literature in several
ways. First, there are only a few empirical studies of tax compliance for developing
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countries. Some characteristics of developing countries, such as a large unregistered
economy and bureaucratic inefficiency may cause tax evasion analysis in developing
countries to be different than those in developed countries. I specifically focus on
data from Turkey to analyze the compliance behavior of taxpayers. The data set
that I chose to use is panel data from years 2004 through 2007, which allows me
to take advantage of both regional and time variation in the number of audits. In
other words, while Tauchen et al. (1992) and Dubin and Wilde (1988) use regional
variation only, I use both regional and time variation for the number of audits. Using
panel data is especially important if taxpayers make their tax reporting decisions
based on audit probability from this year as well as from previous year. Second,
I control for the detectibility of an audit. Given that a tax return is audited, the
probability of detecting tax evasion can vary depending on the quality of auditor and
the efficiency of local tax office. The province specific detection rate allows me to
use the variation in audit quality between provinces. Third, wage and salary earners
are not supposed to file a tax return in Turkey. When using aggregated data, this
gives us some degree of flexibility since we do not have to worry about the type of
the tax return (i.e wage income vs. business income). Finally, I analyze the effects
of institutional reforms of tax administration in Turkey. In 29 provinces, T.O.D.s
were established to increase taxpayer service and carry out strategic auditing. Many
other developing countries are planning to reform their tax administration partly or
fully to make them more efficient. Analyzing the implications of this specific reform
can help policymakers to make a better decision about tax administration reforms
in general.
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I find that audits have a strong positive effect on reported income and tax
liability. The effectiveness of audits is the same for reported income and tax liability.
The reason for this is that the income tax system in Turkey is not as complex as
the income tax system in U.S.A. There is almost a perfectly linear relationship
between reported income and reported tax liability denoting that there is very less
scope for deductions. Increasing the quality of an audit is also found to reduce
tax evasion significantly. However, it is not as effective as increasing the audit
coverage. I also find that the unemployment rate, which tends to have no direct
impact on auditing, has dramatic effects on reported income and reported tax. This
is because unemployment is generally associated with low tax base. The reform in
the tax administration (i.e establishing T.O.D.s) had no significant effect on taxpayer
compliance. However, the number of tax returns increased considerably during the
post-reform period. This suggests that tax reform had an effect at the extensive
margin rather than at the intensive margin. In other words, existing taxpayers
did not change their compliance behavior, yet more individuals started to file tax
returns. This is due to the increased efforts of T.O.D.s to register more taxpayers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 of this paper
summarizes the tax system in Turkey and data characteristics. Section 3 presents
a model of tax evasion and estimation results. Section 4 investigates the effects of
tax administration reform (i.e establishing T.O.D.s). Section 5 concludes with some
comments on the policy implications of my results.
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3.2 Turkey’s Tax System and Data
Before explaining the details about the data, it is worth mentioning some
facts about the Turkish tax system in general. The tax regime in Turkey can be
classified under three main categories: income tax, taxes on expenditures, and taxes
on wealth. All three types of tax rates are set by the government and collected by
local tax offices. Income tax also falls into two different categories: personal income
tax and corporate income tax. The data in this study comes from personal income
tax returns only. The income tax scheme is progressive, with marginal tax being 15%
for the lowest income bracket and 35% for the highest income bracket. An individual
whose income is earned only from a wage is not obligated to file an annual return.
The employer deducts tax from the employee and transfers it to the tax authority
every month. Taxes withheld at the source are declared to the tax office by the
evening of the 20th day of the following month. Other individuals whose income is
earned through commercial activities, agriculture, capital investment (interest and
dividends), immovable assets and rights, and miscellaneous income and earnings are
required to file a tax return. The annual tax return for these individuals is due each
calendar year by the 15th day of the March of the following year.
After the tax returns are filed and delivered to the tax office, some tax
returns are scheduled for audit. The rest of the auditing procedure is as follows.
The taxpayer is notified by tax office of an audit. The auditor meets with the
taxpayer to see the taxpayer’s required paperwork. After auditing the tax return,
if the auditor finds no difference between the reported income and his own finding,
then the audit ends. If the auditor finds that the taxpayer has underreported his
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true income, a new tax amount and a fine is billed to the taxpayer.
The taxpayer has three options at this stage: He can choose to pay the
additional tax and fine, he can request a negotiation with tax office, or he can go
to court. Requesting a negotiation with the tax office means that the taxpayer
accepts that he underreported his income, but he disagrees with the amount of
underreporting and the fine. Most of the time, the tax office reduces the tax liability
and the fine amount during a negotiation so that the taxpayer will agree to pay them.
The reason for giving underreporting taxpayers a negotiation option is to discourage
them from going to court. By doing so, the tax office collects the tax liability and fine
sooner. The P.T.A. reports that about 90% of negotiations result in an agreement3.
If the negotiation process ends without agreement, then the taxpayer may go to
court. Figure 1 depicts the auditing process in Turkey.
There are 81 provinces in Turkey, and within these provinces there are coun-
ties. The number of counties in each province varies depending on the population
and the geographic characteristics of that province. Local jurisdictions have no
right to set different taxes or to change the tax rates set by the government. In
each county, tax offices are responsible for collecting all types of taxes and pursuing
audits.
For the purpose of this study, I use data from two different sources: the
Presidency of Tax Administration of Turkey and household budget surveys. Provin-
cial data includes the number of audits, reported tax, reported tax liability, number
3See annual report of Presidency of Tax Administration.
www.gib.gov.tr/fileadmin/user upload/yayinlar/2006 Faaliyet Raporu.pdf
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Figure 3.1: Auditing Process
of negotiations, number of tax returns, and number of tax office workers, which was
taken from the Presidency of Tax Administration data of 2003 through 2007. Tax
return data comes from individual income taxpayers whose income is not from wages
and salaries, since wage and salary earners do not have to file an annual income tax
return. The number of tax office workers refers to the total number of tax office
workers in a province. Household budget surveys provide province data from 2003
to 2007 on unemployment levels, education levels, income levels and the percent
of individuals who do not have health insurance. For 2007, I combine 2003-2006
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household budget survey data and use it to project 2007 values.
3.3 Effect of Audits on Compliance
3.3.1 Model
Let i denote the province, and t the year. Taxpayers differ with respect to
their taxable income y; each taxpayer privately knows his own income and is assigned
to a given province. The distribution of income for the set of taxpayers assigned
to province i in year t is denoted by Fit(y). Taxpayers are identical in all other
respects; specifically, they share a common constant relative risk aversion utility
function defined over their after-tax income: c : u(c) = 1αc
α, where α < 1,= 0, with
the case α = 0 corresponding to logc. The tax law prescribes a constant tax rate τ
lying between 0 and 1 and a constant penalty rate f on tax evasion established in
an audit (and upheld in case the taxpayer appeals)4. Alternatively, if the taxpayer
pays a bribe to the auditor in order to avoid paying the legal penalty, f can be
interpreted as the bribe rate. From the taxpayer’s standpoint, any payments that
have to be made in the event of discovery of tax evasion by the auditor, bribes or
fines, deter tax evasion, so the taxpayer’s optimal disclosure is qualitatively similar
with or without corruption.
Following an audit, the auditor will discover all income underreported with
probability kit otherwise no evasion will be discovered. The audit probability in
province i in time t is denoted as πit. Each taxpayer knows the enforcement
4In real world penalties on tax evasion depend on the amount and the type of the evasion. In
my empirical analysis below structure of the penalties on tax evasion is irrelevant as long as they
are the same across provinces.
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variables kit, and πit that characterizes his province. In the manner of Allingham
and Sandmo (1972), each taxpayer confronts an audit lottery. He selects a level of
income to disclose yd not exceeding his true income y, in order to maximize expected
utility.
W (yd, y, pit) = pitu((1− τ)y − fτ(y − yd)) + [1− pit]u(y − τyd) (3.1)
where pit ≡ πitkit denotes the effective probability of detection. Given constant
relative risk aversion, it is easily checked that every taxpayer decides to disclose
a constant fraction r of his true income, which depends on tax and enforcement
parameters pit,τ ,f. Using the utility function above, the first order condition of
maximizing (3.1):
fp[(1− τ)y − fτ(y − yd)]α−1 = (1− p)[y − τyd]α−1 (3.2)
re-organizing terms, we get:











Hence total reported taxes in province i in year t equals
Rit = r(pit, τ, f)Yit
where Yit denotes aggregate reported income of the taxpayer population for
unit i in year t. It is well-known that r is increasing in enforcement variables pit
and f . Of key interest are the determinants of pit. This depends on (a) the fraction
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of returns that will be subjected to audit and (b) on the quality of these audits (i.e
detection ratio). Consequently, I specify the following equation for reported income:
Rit = β0 + β1Ki + β2Tt + β3Ait + β4Dit + β5Yit + εit (3.4)
where Ki denotes a vector of variables specific to each province, Tt is a
year dummy representing effects of shifts in tax policy, Ait is the probability of an
audit, Dit is the probability of detecting the tax evasion given that the taxpayer is
audited, Yit is the income level, and εit is a disturbance term picking up the effects of
location specific shocks. I use education level, unemployment level, and percentage
of individuals without health insurance as province specific variables. Equation(3.4)
corresponds to following regression equations.
RIit = β0 + β1Unempit + β2Educit + β3Uninsit (3.5)
+ β4Auditit + β5Detectit + β6Incomeit + β7Y eart + εit
RTLit = δ0 + δ1Unempit + δ2Educit + δ3Uninsit (3.6)
+ δ4Auditit + δ5Detectit + δ6Incomeit + δ7Y eart+εit
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Table 1
Variable Definitions and Sources1
Return 2 number of income tax returns filed
RI 2 aggregate reported individual income divided by the number of individual
tax return filed, inflation adjusted, in thousand Turkish Liras4
RTL 2 aggregate reported tax lability divided by the number of individual tax return
filed, inflation adjusted, in thousand Turkish Liras
Audit 2 aggregate number of individual income tax returns examined divided by total individual
income tax returns filed-the individual audit rate.
Negot 2 number of negotiations between taxpayer who caught evading tax
and tax office
Unemp 3 the unemployment rate
Detect 2 total number of negotiations divided by the total number of audits
-individual detection rate
Worker 2 number of tax office workers divided by the total returns filed
Educ 3 percentage of working population with at least high school education
Unins 3 percentage of individuals who do not have health insurance
Income 3 Income per capita, inflation adjusted, in thousand Turkish Liras
1 All the variables are at the province level.
2 Data is taken from the Presidency of Tax Administration of Turkey.
3 Data is taken from the household budget survey.
4 1 Turkish Lira is approximately equal to .7 U.S. dollars.
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Table 2 : Descriptive Statistics1
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Number of Obs.
Return 14706 1113 924 62840 400
RI 4.47 1.64 .26 9.06 400
RTL 1.09 .413 .07 2.57 400
Audit .03 .03 .002 .22 320
Negot 567 624 15 3348 320
Unemp .09 .03 .04 .17 400
Detect .50 .36 .05 .91 320
Worker .02 .01 .001 .09 320
Educ .23 .08 .1 .53 400
Unins .30 .06 .16 .75 400
Income 7.71 1.63 .63 14.40 400
1 The data for Return, RI, RTL , Unemp, Educ, Unins and Income is available from
2003 through 2007. For Audit, Negot, Detect and Worker the data is available
from 2004 through 2007.
My choice of independent variables for the ”reporting effect” equation is
motivated by two considerations: the size of the tax base and the compliance be-
havior of the taxpayers. Variables which are primarily related to the tax base are
income, unemployment, and percentage of non-insured individuals. Variables that
are related to the compliance behavior of the taxpayers include education, audit,
and detection rate. Table 1 presents the description and sources of variables that I
will be using in my estimations. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.
My expectation regarding the effect of these variables on reported income per
return (RI ) and reported tax liability per return (RTL) are based on the theoretical
model that I present above as well as the previous studies on tax compliance5. In
5see Beron, Tauchen, and Witte(1992) for the effect of socioeconomics variables on compliance.
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general, higher income taxpayers have increased opportunities to evade, but there
is a strong direct relationship between real income per capita and RI or RTL.
In fact, the latter effect should be quite large, leading to a positive coefficient on
income in both regression equations. Provinces with a higher unemployment ratio
(Unemp) may have unsound economies and thus yield lower RI and RTL. This
effect is reinforced if unemployment is associated with underground economy and
thus produces non-compliance. On the other hand, if most unemployed taxpayers
have relatively low income, then RI and RTL should rise as a portion of the lower
tail of the distribution of income is eliminated. To the extent this effect is dominated
by the previous effect, I expect a negative coefficient on Unemp. Individuals who
work in underground economy are less likely to have health insurance. The higher
the percentage of individuals without health insurance(Unins) in a province, the
greater is the underground economy will be in that province. Thus, I expect Unins
to effect RI and RTL negatively.
Variables that are primarily related to the compliance behavior of the tax-
payers include one variable which reflect opportunities to evade and two variables
which reflect tax authority enforcement activities. The percent of the adult popula-
tion with at least a high school education is thought to be positively related to tax
noncompliance, presumably because more educated individuals are better able to
play the the ”tax lottery”. Thus, with respect to RI and RTL, I expect a positive
coefficient on EDUC. Finally, although I expect increases in the audit rate(AUDIT )
to increase taxpayer compliance and thus RI and RTL, audit rates presumably re-
spond to compliance level, so I cannot treat audit rates as an exogenous factor. My
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model allows for endogeneity of AUDIT. Federal Tax Authority might be assigning
more auditors to the provinces where tax evasion is more common. This causes more
tax returns to be audited in provinces with higher tax evasion rate. In this case,
correlation between audit and the unobservable will lead to inconsistent estimates of
the parameters using ordinary least squares estimation. Consistent estimation then
requires the use of an ”instrument”, which is correlated with audit rates but not with
the compliance rate. I use province level tax office workers per return(WORKER)
as instrument for AUDIT. In choosing this variable as an ”instrument”, two criteria
must be considered. First, changes in province level tax office workers per return
should systematically affect the audit schedule. The correlation between those two
is .62, which implies a positive correlation between WORKER and AUDIT. Second,
province level workers per return should not be causally linked with compliance
levels. It is very unlikely that taxpayers base their decisions on the province level
number of tax office workers. Tax authorities determine the number of tax office
workers in each province mainly based on the population of the province. Thus, it
is reasonable to use WORKER as an instrument for AUDIT.
Another important variable which is related with compliance behavior in
equations 3.5 and 3.6, is the variable DETECT. Measure of detection rate should be
measured as the ratio of the number of taxpayers who caught evading to the number
of taxpayers who were audited. However, I do not have the data for the number of
taxpayers who caught evading tax. Instead, I use data from negotiations between
the taxpayer and the tax office after the taxpayer is caught evading. This is justified
if the percent of caught taxpayers who chooses to negotiate does not vary between
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provinces. Alternatively, if the majority of the caught taxpayers choose to negotiate
instead of just paying the fine or going to court, the number of negotiation is a
good approximation for the number of taxpayers who caught. The annual report of
Presidency of Revenue Administration states that over 85% of the taxpayers who
caught evading tax requests a negotiation with the tax office6. Therefore, using the
number of negotiations as a proxy for the number of taxpayers who caught evading
tax is reasonable. Finally, I measure the detection rate(DETECT ) as the ratio of
the number of negotiations to the number of audits. As the theory suggests, we
expect detection rate to have a positive impact on volunteer compliance.
Whether audit rates should be treated as endogenous is ultimately an em-
pirical issue, but the question is amenable to a formal specification test due to
Hausman(1978). Hausman’s method includes as an additional explanatory variable
the predicted value of AUDIT derived from a reduced form equation in which in-
dependent variables include those specified in equations 3.5 and 3.6 as well as the
instruments. Hausman shows that endogeneity of AUDIT is given by testing the
significance of the additional explanatory variable. To form a predicted value of
AUDIT, I estimate the reduced form equation:
Auditit = γ0 + γ1Unempit + γ2Educit + γ3Y eart (3.7)
+ γ4Incomeit + γ5Detectit + γ6WORKER+ εit
This equation contains the maintained exogenous variables Unemp, Educ,
region,Detect, Income, and Y ear. It also includes the instrumental variable WORKER.
6www.gib.gov.tr/fileadmin/user upload/yayinlar/2006 Faaliyet Raporu.pdf
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The results of the OLS estimates of the equation 3.7 are presented in Table 4. The
Hausman statistics for the endogeneity of AUDIT corresponds to a t-test for the
significance of the coefficient on the predicted value of AUDIT , which is obtained
from equation 3.7, in equations 3.5 and 3.6. The regressions for testing the endo-
geneity AUDIT are presented in Table 3. In both regressions AUDIT is found to
be endogenous because coefficients of AUDIT and PAUDIT are significant.
3.3.1.1 Results
Table 4 contains results of the two-stage least squares estimation for the
reported income (RI) and reported tax liability (RTL). Note first that the model
explains much of the variation in RI and RTL. R2 is .54 for RI and .56 for RTL. As
might be expected, the coefficients on income are by far the most significant of the
estimated coefficients in the RI and RTL equations. The coefficient on income in RI
is .47, suggesting that one Turkish Lira increase in income will result in .47 Turkish
Lira increase in reported income. The difference can emerge because of the failures to
fully report income to tax office. Alternatively, the difference can partly be explained
by the underground economy. Some individuals in the household survey might be
revealing their income but may not be filing a tax return. Overall, the coefficient
of the income and its statistical significance suggest that my income measure from
Household Survey is a good proxy for real income level of the individuals. The
coefficient on income in the RTL equation provide an estimate of the marginal tax
rate on total income (income before exclusions and deductions by the tax code).
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The coefficient of income in the RTL equation is .13, implying that one Turkish Lira
increase in income will cause Tax Liability to increase .13 Turkish Lira. Marginal
tax rates in Turkey start from 15% for the lowest income bracket and goes up to
20%, 27% and 35% for the highest income brackets. Considering that the majority
of the taxpayers fall into the low marginal tax rate brackets in Turkey, the existence
of tax evasion and underground economy, the marginal tax rates implied by the
income coefficient is reasonable.
I find that increasing the odds of an audit significantly increases reported
income and reported tax liability. It is not surprising that the probability of an
audit is significant at 1% when we consider the data characteristic. It is important
to remember that data is composed of tax returns of individuals whose income is not
from wages and salaries. For these individuals, it is easier to hide their income, and
previous studies find self employed taxpayers are more likely to evade compared to
taxpayers whose income is only from wages and salaries.7 Coefficients of the Audit
in both regressions imply that elasticities for RI and RTL with respect to audit
are .18 and .15 respectively.8 These elasticities imply that a 1% increase in audit
coverage would lead to approximately a 16.5 million Turkish Lira increase in RI and
a 3.8 million Turkish Lira increase in RTL. The finding that elasticity for RI with
respect to Audit is slightly greater than elasticity for RTL with respect to Audit
is in contrast with the findings of Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1992). Beron et al.
7See Slemrod(2007) for further discussion on tax compliance od self employed taxpayers.
8The elasticities are calculated at the mean values of reported income, reported tax liability
and audit rate. Elasticity of RI with respect to Audit is 27 × .03
4.47
= .18. Elasticity of RTL with




find elasticity of reported income with respect to audit is smaller than the elasticity
of reported tax liability. They support their finding with the IRS’s belief that
its auditors are better able to find over-reported substraction than underreported
income. Thus, Beron et al. conclude that audits are more effective in finding over-
deductions in tax returns rather than finding underreported income. The income
tax code in Turkey is not as complicated as in the U.S. Also, there are only a
limited number of items that can be deducted from taxable income which decreases
over-deduction opportunity considerably.9 This suggests that the deterrent effect of
audits should not be significantly different for reported income and tax liability. In
fact, the elasticities that I calculate for RI and RTL with respect to audit are not
statistically different than each other. The other variable in the regression equations
that comes from the structural model is detection rate (Detect). In Table 3, it is
seen that detection rate significantly increases RI and RTL. Coefficients of Detect
imply that elasticities for RI and RTL with respect to detection rate are .04 and
.05 respectively. Comparing the effect of audits and detection rate on RI and RTL,
we see that the audit rate is more effective in increasing RI and RTL than the
detection rate. There are several explanations for this. First, generally the audit
rate is floating around 3% while the detection rate is around 50%. If the audit
rate and detection rate has a decreasing marginal effect on RI and RTL, then the
elasticity of audit will be greater than the elasticity of detection since the average
audit rate is much lower than the average detection rate.
9There is only one type income tax return form and deductions can be made for education,
health and insurance expenses as well as the donations made to non-profit organizations.
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1 Paudit is obtained from the reduced form regression.
t statistics are in parenthesis.
* statistically significant at 10%
** statistically significant at 1%
Second, since the detection rate is more private information compared to audit rate,
some taxpayers may not take the detection rate into account while making their
reporting decision. This causes audits to be more effective in increasing RI and
RTL. Finally, detection rate may be prone to endogeneity problem and the results
can be downward biased. If the detection rate is correlated with unobservables like
audit rate, the coefficient of Detect will be biased.
The coefficient of unemployment variable is negative and significant at the
1% level in both regressions. This could be because provinces with higher unem-
ployment rates have unstable economies, and this may cause the tax base to be less.
The effect will be more if unemployment is associated with underground economy.
The effect of education on compliance is generally found to be negative in some of
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the previous works, while it is found to be positive in some others.10 Jackson and
Milliron (1986) suggest that the more educated may be less compliant because they
better understand the opportunities for evasion and are more willing to play the
audit lottery than are the less educated. However, Dubin and Wilde (1988) find
that the educated are more compliant with the tax laws. I find a negative effect
of education on compliance. Education is significant for RI equation, but it is not
significant for RTL equation. Finally, the percentage of individuals who do not have
any health insurance (Unins) has insignificant effect on compliance. I used Unins
as a proxy for underground economy, since most of the individuals who work in
underground economy do not have any health insurance. The Unemp variable can
also be associated with underground economy and serve as a proxy for underground
economy.
10Beron, Tauchen, and Witte(1992) and Dubin and Wilde(1988) find education is negatively
related with compliance.
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Table 4: Effect of Audits on Compliance1
























































N 320 320 320
R2 .54 .56 .61
1 IV Estimation. Observations are clustered for each province.
t statistics in parenthesis.
* statistically significant at 10%
** statistically significant at 1%
3.4 Tax Administration Reform
In this section, I analyze the effect of establishing Tax Office Direc-
torates (T.O.D.) in 29 provinces on taxpayer compliance. The reform in the tax
administration was realized both at the federal level and at the local level. At the
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federal level, the main institutional and organizational change was the establish-
ment of a semi-autonomous tax administration operating on a functional basis. The
Presidency of Revenue Administration plans to carry out their tax responsibilities
by simplifying the system and by providing necessary assistance to the taxpayers in
order to minimize the burden on Turkish citizens. At the local level, the T.O.D. was
established to identify potential taxpayers and register them with the tax office, en-
force and improve tax compliance, inform taxpayers about their responsibilities and
rights, collect data, and audit taxpayers. The T.O.D. also supervises, and provides
coordination between tax collecting offices in counties. Before the establishment
of T.O.D.s, there was no organizational connection or cooperation between the tax
collecting offices in different counties. One branch of the T.O.D. is responsible for
helping taxpayers in filing their returns. This branch also has a call center to an-
swer taxpayers’ questions. Another branch of the T.O.D. is an auditing unit which
is responsible for collecting data on the results of the audits and using the data
to increase audit quality. Finally, the last branch of the T.O.D. is responsible for
educating the auditors and other tax office workers. A representative organization
scheme of the T.O.D.s is provided in Figure 2.
The duties of the T.O.D. imply that it aims to increase tax compliance
in two ways. First, by increasing taxpayer help services and informing taxpayers
about their responsibilities and rights, the T.O.D.s intend to increase voluntary
tax compliance. Second, T.O.D.s plan to increase enforcement and its quality. By
collecting data and information on taxpayers T.O.D.s strive to increase the quality
of audits. The increased enforcement (higher audit and detection rates) increases
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Figure 3.2: Tax Office Directorate
compliance as the theory and my findings in part 1 suggest. The question that
we want to answer at this point is whether establishing T.O.D. in 29 provinces
increased compliance compared to provinces where no T.O.D. was established. I
use 52 provinces that have no T.O.D. as a control group and 29 provinces that have
T.O.D. as a treatment group. A dif-in-dif methodology is employed to isolate the
effect of establishing a T.O.D. on tax compliance. The provinces in the treatment
group experienced the change in their tax administration in May 2005. The selection
process for the provinces where T.O.D.s were established is not random. This would
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have been a problem for a controlled experiment if the selection process was based
on the compliance results of the provinces. However, the federal tax authority
decided where to establish a T.O.D. according to the number of tax returns of
the provinces rather than the compliance results of provinces. In Figure 3, we see
that the selection process is generally based on the population rather than on the
compliance of the province. All provinces with a T.O.D. have greater number of tax
returns than non-T.O.D. provinces. However, reported income per return seems to
have no direct relationship with existence of a T.O.D. in a province. For pre-reform
compliance, I use 2004 and 2003 returns. For post-reform compliance, I use 2006
and 2007 returns. If establishing T.O.D.s has any effect on compliance, 2006 and
2007 tax returns should reflect that effect. I run the following difference in difference
regressions to estimate the treatment effect.
log(RIit) = β0 + β1treatment+ β2reform+ β3reform∗treatment+ εit (3.8)
log(RTLit) = β0 + β1treatment+ β2reform+ β3reform∗treatment+ εit (3.9)
where treatment is the dummy variable for the treatment group- if the province has
a T.O.D., treatment is 1, otherwise it is 0. The variable reform is the other dummy
for post-reform period. If the observation belongs to the post-reform period (2006
or 2007), then reform is 1. If the observation belongs to pre-reform period (2003 or
2004), then reform is 0. I use the logs for reported income and tax lability because
it allows me to see the effects as a percentage increase rather than levels. Since
the treatment group is generally composed of large and developed provinces, mean
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of reported income and tax liability is higher for the treatment group compared to
control group. In Table 5, I present mean values of reported income, tax lability,
number of tax returns, and income for control and treatment groups.
The variable of interest is β3 in regression equation 3.8. Difference in dif-
ference regression estimates in Table 6 suggest that establishing T.O.D.s had no
significant effect on neither on RI nor RTL. As seen in the first two columns of
Table 6, coefficient of reform∗treatment is far from being significant. A possible
explanation for this is the following. Theory suggests that increasing audit and
detection rates should increase compliance. My findings in section 2 also supports
this argument. Therefore, either T.O.D.s were not successful in increasing the de-
tection rate, or provinces in control group increased the detection rate along with
the provinces in the treatment group. Using DETECT as a measure for detection
rate, as I used in section 2, I can check whether the detection rate in the treatment
group has increased significantly after reform compared to the control group. I run
the following regression to see the effect of establishing T.O.D.s on the detection
rate:
DETECTit = α0 + α1treatment+ α2reform+ α3reform∗treatment+ εit (3.10)
Again, in the third and fourth column of Table 6, we see that coefficient
of reform∗treatment is close to zero, which means establishing T.O.D.s did not
significantly affect the detection rate or audit rate. It is possible that a two-year
period after the establishment of T.O.D.s was not long enough to implement the
necessary changes in auditing strategies. Another possibility is that there is a prob-
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lem with the measure of detection. Given that taxable income per return and tax
lability per return did not increase significantly, as we see in the regression results
of equation 3.8, it is more likely that T.O.D.s were not successful in strategically
auditing taxpayers.
The other goals of T.O.D.s are to increase taxpayer services (i.e helping them
prepare their tax returns) and to audit non-filing individuals who earn income. The
latter goal can also be referred to as controlling the underground economy. In order
to do that, T.O.D.s audit businesses and individuals they think are earning income
but not filing a tax return. I was unable to get data for this kind of auditing.11 In
these types of audits, if individuals are found to be earning income but not filing a tax
return, they have to register themselves to the tax office and pay a fine. Unlike the
theoretical literature on tax evasion, the failure of taxpayers who have filed returns
to report all income, there is not much theoretical literature on non-filers. One of
the few theoretical works is a model due to Graetz and Wilde (1990) dealing with
the decision by non-filers to participate in tax amnesties. In their model, however,
taxpayers who file returns are assumed to report honestly. Next, I analyze the effect
of establishing T.O.D.s on the number of tax returns. The dif-in-dif regression for
the number of tax returns is the following:
log(returnit) = λ0 + λ1treatment+ λ2reform+ λ3reform∗treatment+ εit
where log(retrurnit) is the log of number of tax returns. We see in the last column
11I was unable to obtain data of this type of audits. The Federal Tax Authority in Turkey has
such data but unfortunately I couldn’t get it so far.
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of Table 6 that the coefficient for reform∗treatment is positive and significant.
Therefore, I conclude that establishing T.O.D.s had a positive effect on the number
of tax returns.12 In other words, T.O.D.s were successful in finding non-filers and
registering them as a taxpayer. This result is not surprising when we think of
the size of the underground economy in Turkey. Even a small effort to increase
the number of filers pays off because the size of the underground economy is huge
compared to developed countries. The lack of data on efforts to increase the number
of tax returns prevents us from comparing the effects of regular tax return audits
and non-filer audits.
12One might be suspicious about the relationship between number of tax returns and reported
income or tax liability. Our compliance variables RI and RTL are reported income and tax liability
per return. Having more individuals filing a tax return will not effect these variables as long as the
mean values of RI and RTL for the new filers are close to the mean values of RI and RTL for the
existing filers.
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Table 5: Treatment and Control group sample selection1
Mean Reported Mean Tax Mean number Mean Number of
Income Lability of tax return Income observation
All Sample 4.44 1.06 14645 7.69 320
Control Group 3.84 .90 5666 7.21 208
Treatment Group 5.58 1.37 31321 8.59 112
Difference2(Treatment-Control) 1.74** .47** 25655** 1.37**
(8.9) (10.3) (14.5) (6.3)
1 data is from years 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2007. 2003 and 2004 are pre-reform period, while 2006 and 2007 are post-reform period.
2 t statistics are in parenthesis.
** statistically significant at 1%.
Table 6. Dif-in-Dif Regressions1
Dependent Variable









































R2 .35 .27 .16 .33 .57
N 320 240 240 320 320
1 Observations are clustered for each province.
t statistics are in parenthesis.
* statistically significant at 10%
** statistically significant at 1%
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3.5 Conclusion
Empirical studies on tax evasion are limited due to data availability.
Many of these studies use data from developed countries, and there are only a few
empirical analyses of tax evasion in developing countries. Many developing countries
suffer from a large underground economy, bureaucratic inefficiency, and economic
instability. Thus, an analysis of tax evasion for these countries might yield different
results than the studies of developed countries. I use province level income tax return
data from Turkey to estimate the effect of audits and tax administration reform
on tax compliance. My measure of compliance is reported income and reported
tax liability. They are not perfect measures of compliance; however, considering
the difficulty and complexity of getting direct measures for compliance or evasion,
reported income and tax liability can be a good proxy for compliance as long as
the income level is controlled in estimation. Controlling for the income level and
allowing for the endogeneity of audits, my analysis of the Turkish panel data set has
yielded a number of results.
First, audits have a strong positive effect on reported income and tax liability.
The data set I use is comprised of self employed taxpayers who generally have more
opportunities to evade. Thus the coefficients audits that I find are larger compared to
previous studies that use data sets including wage and salary earners. Furthermore,
the effectiveness of audits is the same for reported income and tax liability. The
reason for this might be that the income tax system in Turkey is not as complex
as the income tax system in the U.S.A, and there are not many opportunities to
make deductions. Or, the reason might be that the detection rate is endogenous,
94
and this may cause the coefficients to be biased. The latter possibility can be tested
if an appropriate instrumental variable is found for the detection rate. I also find
that the unemployment rate, which tends to have no direct impact on auditing, has
dramatic effects on reported income and reported tax. This is generally because
unemployment is associated with a low tax base.
Second, the reform in the tax administration (i.e establishing T.O.D.s) had
no significant effect on compliance. Neither the detection rate of evasion nor the
audit rate has increased during the post-reform period. However, the number of tax
returns increased considerably during the post-reform period. This suggests that tax
reform had an effect at the extensive margin rather than at the intensive margin.
In other words, existing taxpayers did not change their compliance behavior, yet
more individuals started to file tax returns. Tanzi and Pellechio (1995) states that
strengthening if tax administration will not result in higher revenue in the short run.
The two year period after the reform can be too short to see the positive effects of
the reform on compliance.
In developing countries where unregistered economy is common, the tax
revenue gain from efforts to increase the number of tax filers can be very large. A
natural question that can be asked is whether tax return audits or efforts to increase
the number of tax filers has a larger impact on tax revenues. In order to compare
those two effects, we would need data on the efforts to increase the tax filing rate
in addition to audit data.
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Figure 3.3: Tax Office Directorate Selection Process
-Tax Authorities chose provinces to establish a Tax Office Directorate according to






1.1 Expenditure function approach
From the maximization problem of the individual taxpayer, we can figure
out demand functions for C1 and C2, supply function for L, and tax evaded E as
the optimal choices. Since we derive the first order conditions in eqs. (2.4) - (2.7)
in section 3 and reformulate the two budget constraints with the virtual income Z
(regarded as exogenously given) in section 4, the optimal choice functions C1, C2, L
and E can have as their arguments the net wage rate (1−m)w, audit rate p, penalty
rate π, publicly supplied nonmarket good G, and transfer Z. Thus, the indirect
expected utility function Ū∗ can be constructed as Ū∗ = Ū∗ ((1−m)w, p, π,G,Z) ≡
(1− p)U(C1 (·) , V (·) , G) + pU(C2 (·) , V (·) , G) where the dot represents the vector
of the arguments mentioned above. By using the Envelope Theorem, we have the
partial derivatives of Ū∗ with respect to each of the parameters (1−m)w, p, π, and
Z as follows:
Ū∗(1−m)w = (λ1 + λ2)L, (1.1)
Ū∗p = U(C2, V,G)− U(C1, V,G) ≤ 0, (1.2)
Ū∗π = −λ2E, (1.3)
Ū∗Z = λ1 + λ2. (1.4)
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In order to develop the relationship between the uncompensated and com-
pensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to each of the net wage rate (1−m)w,
the audit rate p and fine rate θ, we exploit the expenditure function approach.
Now, the uncompensated and compensated labor supply are equal at the optimum:
L
(
(1−m)w, p, π,G, Z
(




(1−m)w, p, π,G, Ū∗
)
. Partially
differentiate this identity to get three Slutsky equations that are associated with the
net wage rate (1−m)w, the probability rate p and the penalty rate π:
L(1−m)w + LZZ(1−m)w = L
c
(1−m)w, (1.5)
Lp + LZZp = Lcp, (1.6)
Lπ + LZZπ = Lcπ. (1.7)
Since Z can be found by inverting the indirect utility function Ū∗, it is easy to derive
the partial derivatives of the virtual income Z from eqs. (1.1) - (1.4) together with



















The first-order Taylor expansion is used in order to approximate the marginal utility
function U (C1, V,G) to U (C2, V,G) + UC (C2, V,G) (C1 − C2) in eq. (1.9). Insert
eqs. (1.8) - (1.10) into three Slutsky equations above, and then multiply the results
by (1−m)w/L, P/L and θ/L respectively to get three relationship between the
uncompensated and compensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to the net
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wage, audit, and fine rate:








LZ = εcθ. (1.13)
In eqs. (1.11) - (1.13), the superscript c indicates “compensated,” while no super-
script implies “uncompensated.” The parameters η, εp, and εθ denote the elasticity
of labor supply with respect to the net wage, audit, and fine rate respectively. Fur-
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